Stockholm University
Department of Political Science
Master thesis
June 2009

UNITED NATIONS PEACEBUILDING COMMISSION
- Towards a New Paradigm for Conflict Resolution?

Author: Elin Bengtsson
bengtssonelin@spray.se


ABSTRACT

Since the beginning of the 90s peacekeeping interventions have increased but only few
conflicts have been resolved. This thesis argues that the possibility for conflict resolution
depends on our definition of peace, on the application of suitable methods and by adopting an
appropriate approach to every specific conflict. However, most crucial is to adopt a positive
definition of the very concept of peace. This theoretical framework presents the main critique
of current peacebuilding and proposes recommendations for a new peacebuilding paradigm.
These provide for a set of ideal types that will function as a strainer when analysing the
material that consists of conflict analyses and policy documents. A case study on the United
Nations Peacebuilding Commission will be limited to interventions by the international
community on three field sites: Mozambique, Somalia and Burundi. A positive example
(Mozambique) underlines the validity of the relation between variables, that is ‘the signing of a
peace agreement’ together with ‘an adequate peacebuilding response’ will result in ‘lasting
peace’. A negative example (Somalia) shows the absence of ‘lasting peace’ where there only is a
‘signing of a peace agreement’ but a lack of ‘an adequate peacebuilding response’. In the light
of this analysis the third example Burundi is examined according to the theoretical framework.
The analysis shows that the Peacebuilding Commission for Burundi rather well corresponds to
the recommendations for a new adequate peacebuilding response. However, since the Burundi
Commission only is at an initial stage, it is far to soon to evaluate the outcomes. Nevertheless,
the Peacebuilding Commission appear to be a product of the reform of the United Nations
focusing on prevention and an initiative that presents valuable insight for a peacebuilding
response aiming at promoting durable peace.


ABBREVIATIONS

AMIB African peacekeeping mission in Burundi
AMISOM African Union Mission to Somalia
ARS Liberation Front Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia
AU African Union
BBC British Broadcasting Company
BINUB Bureau Intégré des Nations Unies au Burundi (United Nations Integrated Office
in Burundi)
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
CNDD National Council for the Defence of Democracy
CSMN Military Committee for National Salvation
DDR Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
DPKO United Nations Department for Peacekeeping Operations
DRC Democratic Republic of Congo
FDD Forces for the Defense of Democracy
FDN Forces de Défense Nationale (National Defence Force)
FNL Forces Nationales de Libération (National Liberation Front)
FRELIMO Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (Liberation Front of Mozambique)
FRODEBU Hutu Front for Democracy in Burundi
ICG International Crisis Group
IGAD Inter-governmental Authority on Development
IMF International Monetary Fund
IO International Organisation
IPBS Integrational Peacebuilding Strategy
ISCG International Somalia Contact Group
LAS League of Arab States
MDGs Millennium Development Goals
NGO Non-governmental Organisation
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
ONUMOZ United Nations Operations in Mozambique
PBC Peacebuilding Commission
PBF Peacebuilding Fund
PBSO Peacebuilding Support Office
PRSP Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
RENAMO Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (Mozambican National Resistance)
SICC Supreme Islamic Courts Council
Sida Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
SSR Security Sector Reform
TFG Transitional Federal Government
UD Utrikesdepartementet (Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs)
UIC Union of Islamic Courts
UN United Nations
UNOHAC United Nations Office for Humanitarian Assistance Coordination
UNPOS United Nations Political Office for Somalia
UPRONA Union pour le Progrès National (Union for National Progress)
US United States of America
USIP United States Institute of Peace


CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 7
1. INTRODUCTION 8
1.1. Background ................................................................................................................................... 8
1.2. Research problem ........................................................................................................................ 8
1.3. Purpose and research question ................................................................................................... 9
1.4. Method ....................................................................................................................................... 10
Case study .................................................................................................................................... 10
Analytical tools & framework .................................................................................................... 11
Selection & Material ................................................................................................................... 13
Research strategy ........................................................................................................................ 14
Structure ...................................................................................................................................... 14
2. A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR PEACEBUILDING 16
2.1. The rise, design, change & decline of institutions ................................................................... 16
How can we best understand the process of UN reform? ...................................................... 16
How can the institutionalisation and design of collective security be described?.............. 16
How can the development and change within the UN system be explained?..................... 17
How can the UN’s peacebuilding role best be enhanced? ..................................................... 17
2.2. Defining conflict resolution ..................................................................................................... 18
Multiple approaches to conflict resolution.............................................................................. 18
Methods for conflict resolution ................................................................................................ 19
UN post-settlement peacebuilding........................................................................................... 20
2.3. Critique of current peace building paradigm .......................................................................... 21
State-centric top-down approach ............................................................................................. 22
External intervention ................................................................................................................. 22
Short time-frame for negative peace ........................................................................................ 22
A western perspective ................................................................................................................ 23
Politico- military focus ............................................................................................................... 23
2.4. Towards a new peacebuilding paradigm ................................................................................. 23
Multi-track diplomacy ............................................................................................................... 24
Local empowerment ................................................................................................................... 25
Long-term process for positive peace ....................................................................................... 25
Cultural sensitivity ..................................................................................................................... 26
Psycho-social approach for transformation ............................................................................. 26
3. ILLUSTRATING UN PEACEBUILDING 28
3.1. From violent conflict to peace .................................................................................................. 28
Background & conflict dynamics .............................................................................................. 28
Negotiations & peace agreement .............................................................................................. 28
Implementation & lasting peace ............................................................................................... 29
3.2. Somalia Conflict Analysis......................................................................................................... 30
Background & conflict dynamics .............................................................................................. 30
Negotiations & peace agreement .............................................................................................. 32
Implementation & lasting peace ............................................................................................... 34
3.3. Mozambique Conflict Analysis ................................................................................................ 36
Background & conflict dynamics .............................................................................................. 36
Negotiations & peace agreement .............................................................................................. 37
Implementation & lasting peace ............................................................................................... 38
3.4. Weaknesses and Strengths in UN Peacebuilding ................................................................... 39
State-centric top-down approach vs. Multi-track diplomacy ................................................ 39
External intervention vs. Local empowerment ....................................................................... 40
Short time-frame for negative peace & vs. Long-term process for positive peace .............. 40
Western perspective vs. Cultural sensitivity ........................................................................... 41
Politico- military focus vs. Psycho-social approach for transformation ............................... 41
4. THE BURUNDI PEACEBUILDING COMMISSION 43
4.1. Burundi Conflict Analysis ......................................................................................................... 43
Background & conflict dynamics .............................................................................................. 43
Negotiations & peace agreement .............................................................................................. 45
Implementation & lasting peace ............................................................................................... 46
4.2. UN Peacebuilding Commission for Burundi ........................................................................... 47
PBC Architecture ........................................................................................................................ 47
PBC Burundi ................................................................................................................................ 48
PBC Burundi Strategic Framework ........................................................................................... 48
4.3. PBC Burundi Policy Documents .............................................................................................. 49
Multi-track diplomacy ............................................................................................................... 49
State-centric top down approach.............................................................................................. 51
Local empowerment ................................................................................................................... 51
External intervention ................................................................................................................. 52
Long-term process for positive peace ....................................................................................... 53
Short time-frame for negative peace ........................................................................................ 54
Cultural sensitivity ..................................................................................................................... 54
Western perspective ................................................................................................................... 56
Psycho-social approach for transformation ............................................................................. 56
Politico- military focus ............................................................................................................... 58
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 59
5.1. Summary .................................................................................................................................... 59
5.2. Conclusions ............................................................................................................................... 60
5.3. Future implications................................................................................................................... 61
6. BIBLIOGRAPHY 63
6.1. Literature ...................................................................................................................... 63
6.2. Electronic sources ........................................................................................................ 67
6.3. Policy documents ......................................................................................................... 68
APPENDIX : ABBREVIATIONS 70


ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my gratitude to Bertil Nygren and Jonas Tallberg at the Department for
Political Science at Stockholm University, for important feedback during the entire working
process.

I am also most grateful to the valuable insights and advice provided by Professors Jack E
Spence and Mervyn Frost, as I started this research project in 2005 at the War Studies
Department at King’s College London.

I highly appreciate the interesting discussions that I have had with Elisabet Hedin from Sida,
Anna Hällerman and Silvija Tolomanoska from the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, as
well as Mats Hårsmar from the Nordic Africa Institute. You have all provided important advice
on policy material.

I would in particular like to extend my thanks to Jan Henningsson, also at the Swedish
Ministry for Foreign Affairs, for his engagement, support and always very wise input. I am also
very grateful to other fellow colleges and friends for their valuable insights, in particular to
Julia Hector and Jean-Paul Small for their thorough proofreading.

Finally, I must express my deepest appreciation to my family and in particular to my father
Anders Bengtsson, who in his work as a psychoanalyst, never cease to emphasise that patience
and long term engagement is essential for true change. At the end of the day, this is relevant
for all types of conflict resolution, at the individual micro level as well as in peacebuilding.

1. INTRODUCTIONMany scholars, politicians and field workers have been sceptical to whether conflict resolutionis possible. Likewise, it is often argued that today’s attempts are ineffective at best anddestabilising at worse. However, even if the successful cases appear to be few, they still exist.This is proof enough that conflict resolution can be possible even if it might be more of anexception than a rule. This thesis will argue that the possibility for conflict resolution isdependent on our definition of peace, on the application of suitable methods and by adoptingan appropriate approach to every specific conflict. However, most crucial is to adopt a positivedefinition of the very concept of peace in order to successfully respond to the aspiration fordurable peace.1.1. BackgroundAs a step in the United Nations (UN) reform process, the High-level Panel on Threats,Challenges and Change recommended the establishment of a peacebuilding commission. InDecember 2005, the Security Council and the General Assembly passed two resolutionsestablishing the UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) with the purpose to facilitatepeacebuilding in post-conflict situations.1 This new body was thought to close the institutionalgap that had been localised within the UN architecture for conflict resolution mechanisms.2The first interventions to be carried out under this new mandate were decided to be Burundiand Sierra Leone. In the summer of 2006 I spent a few months working at the UN Secretariat in New York.I came to witness an historical moment in the UN reform process as I participated in the firstbriefings of the Peacebuilding Commission on Sierra Leone and Burundi. While theestablishment of the Commission one year earlier had institutionalised the concept ofpeacebuilding, this initial briefing was the starting point for the instrumentalisation of thatvery concept. These events have been regarded as a milestone for a new form of UN conflictresolution.1.2. Research problemSince the beginning of the 90s, we have witnessed a radical increase in UN peacekeepinginterventions. However, more than fifteen years later, many of these conflicts still persist.1 Resolution 1645 (2005), United Nations Security Council S/RES/1645 (2005) and Resolution 60/180 (2005), United NationsGeneral Assembly A/RES/60/1802 Report on Wilton Park Conference WPS06/2 (2006) Putting decisions into practice: How will the un Peacebuilding Commissionfulfil its mandate?, p.3 Almost half of all peace agreements have fallen apart within five years after the signing, leadingto the relapse into conflict.3 As a consequence, even if UN peacekeeping operations have beensuccessful in bringing about ceasefires and peace agreements in conflict situations, it has beenargued that the UN has failed in implementing and ensuring the respect for the signedcommitments.4 Consequently, the UN has been argued to have two tasks to fulfil when it comes toconflict resolution: peacekeeping is often considered as the first task, and peacebuilding thesecond. While UN peacekeeping is regarded a relative success, peacebuilding has long beenconsidered a vague concept lacking the necessary hands-on follow-up methods andinstruments.5 Traditional conflict resolution, i.e. peacekeeping, draws on a negative definitionof peace, while a positive definition has been connected to the concept of peacebuilding.Negative peace is often described as ‘the absence of violence’ while the positive version ratherdefines peace as when there are genuine ‘conditions for lasting peace’.6 The point of departure for this study is the normative statement that the UN’s traditionaltools for conflict resolution poorly marry with the principle of ‘creating genuine conditions forlasting peace’. Nevertheless, this is far from being a controversial statement. For example, theSecretary General Kofi Annan stated prior to the establishment of the Commission that: “if weare going to prevent conflict we must ensure that peace agreements are implemented in asustained and sustainable manner. Yet at this very point there is a gaping hole in the UnitedNations institutional machinery: no part of the United Nations system effectively addresses thechallenge of helping countries with the transition from war to lasting peace.”7 In addition, justafter the establishment of the Commission the Wilton Park concluded its 2006 conferencewith the recommendations that the PBC “should strive towards enhancing the sustainability ofpeacebuilding”.81.3. Purpose and research questionThe purpose of this research project will be to consider the contribution of the UNPeacebuilding Commission in the case of Burundi. This case will be analysed in the light of theUN’s earlier interventions in Mozambique and Somalia. More precisely, the objective of thisresearch project is therefore to study not only the possible contribution of the Peacebuilding3 Ibid. p.24 Galtung, Johan (1990) Cultural violence Journal of Peace Research, vol.27, no.35 Miall, Ramsbotham & Woodhouse (1999) Contemporary Conflict Resolution: The Prevention, Management and Transformation ofDeadly Conflicts, Polity6 Galtung, Johan (1975) Three approaches to peace: peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding in Galtung Peace, War andDefence – Essays in Peace Research, vol.2, Christian Ejlers, p. 282-3047 Report of the Secretary-General (2005) In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all, United NationsGeneral Assembly A/59/20058 Wilton Park (2006), p.1 9Commission but also if it so far has contributed to the second UN peacebuilding task, i.e. toimplement the signed peace agreement and manage the post-conflict reconstruction phasethus creating more genuine conditions for lasting peace:9 Has the UN PeacebuildingCommission enhanced the United Nations’ ability to fulfil its peacebuilding role?1.4. MethodCase studyThe methodological discussion regarding this study take’s its departure in Bent Flyvbjerg’s‘extreme case’ and Michael Burawoy’s ‘extended case study’. Flyvbjerg’s ‘extreme case’ isconsidered to provide more information on causality because of the in-depth informationconcerning the research problem’s cause and effects.10 So, is this research project a matter ofstudying one, two or three cases? I will agree with John Gerring’s definition of a case study asthe study of a specific ‘unit’ which is a phenomenon bound in time and space. This unit takespart of a ‘larger class’ and a specific selection can therefore consist of several units. One unitexamined at a specific time makes a case study.11 This research project consists of a case studyon the contribution of the UN Peacebuilding Commission. In accordance with Teresa Gowan’suse of different ‘field-sites’, my study will be limited to UN interventions on three sites:Mozambique, Somalia and Burundi.12 I will consider UN post-Cold War peacebuilding(interventions since the beginning of the 90s) as the larger class. Further, Gerring argues that a case study consists of relevant variables founded onobservations.13 So, what are the relevant variables? The theoretical framework will in aqualitative manner clarify the relation between the dependent, independent and intermediaterelevant variables. This will show that the dependent variable is ‘lasting peace’, and theindependent variables ‘the signing of a peace agreement’ and ‘an adequate peacebuildingresponse’. The intermediate variables are the very conditions for peacebuilding based on apositive definition of peace.14 The two dependent variables are individually not enough to fulfil‘lasting peace’, it requires both ‘the signing of a peace agreement’ and ‘an adequatepeacebuilding response’.159 Compare to Thallinger, Gerhard (2007) The UN Peacebuilding Commission and Transitional. Justice, German Law Journal 8(7), p.68110 Flyvbjerg, Bent (2006) Five Misunderstandings about Case-Study Research, Qualitative Inquiry, vol. 12 nr 2, p. 229-23011 Gerring, John (2004) What Is a Case Study and What Is It Good For? American Political Science Review, 98, no. 2, p. 34212 Gowan, Teresa (2002) The Nexus: Homelessness and Incarceration in Two American Cities, Ethnography, vol. 3, no. 4, p. 500-50113 Gerring (2004), p. 34214 See for example Skocpol, Theda (1979) States & Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and ChinaCambridge University Press, p. 12-3215 See for example Gowan (2002), p. 510 10 Is it possible to generalise from the case, field sites and variables discussed above inorder to draw valid conclusions and theorise on behalf of the larger class? Flyvbjerg argues thatit is a misunderstanding that case studies are incapable of generalisation, adding to theorybuilding, and providing for policy propositions.16 Drawing on Burawoy, this study has ‘beenextended’ in two different aspects:17 by methodologically extending through theoretisation andby extending clear casual relations in one study to other study objects.18 As Flyvbjerg, I wouldargue that the examples used will provide deep knowledge on this causal relation and istherefore valid for generalisation. On the other hand, as Burawoy argues, in order to be surethat the generalisation of the causal relations towards the building of a waterproof theory, thestudy would have to be extended to many other field sites or other relevant case studies.Analytical tools & frameworkExactly how will the material be treated? By what techniques will it be analysed? The SwedishInternational Development Cooperation Agency (Sida) acknowledges three vital elements of astrategic conflict analysis in order to “improve the effectiveness of development cooperationand humanitarian assistance in places affected by violent conflicts and insecurity, to provide abetter basis for assessing the potential of conflict-sensitive interventions, and support peaceand security”.19 The analytical framework draws on Sida’s approach to strategic conflict analysisbut with some minor variations.Conflict analysisThe purpose of a conflict analysis is to map conflicts in order to understand causes, dynamicsand forces promoting either peace or conflict.20 Point of departure for the study is threeconflict analyses, each conflict analysis will be divided into three parts (background & conflict,negotiations & agreement and implementation & lasting peace). Drawing on widely usedmethods for conflict analysis, this paper will emphasise the following issues: context, parties,incompatibility, symptoms, power relations, dynamics, solution proposals, and outcome.21Comparative historical analysisThe Sida methodology further underlines the importance of scenario analysis, experimentingon worse case/best case scenarios. In this study it is not relevant to focus on scenarios but16 Flyvbjerg (2006), p. 22117 Burawoy Michael (1998) The Extended Case Method Sociological Inquiry, vol. 16, nr. 1, p. 5- 918 Gowan (2004), p. 500-50119 Sida (2006) Manual for Conflict Analysis, p. 5, 9-1520 Ibid. p. 1021 Ibid. p. 10-12, OECD (2008) Evaluating Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities, p. 29 11rather on actual events that already have occurred. This is why the illustrations will representworse/best peacebuilding examples, that is weaknesses and strengths in UN interventions.22This analysis will draw on John Stuart Mills’ ‘comparative historical analysis’ where the relationbetween variables will be examined through combining a ‘method of agreement’ with a‘method of difference’.23 First, a positive example (Mozambique) underlines the validity of therelation between variables, that is ‘the signing of a peace agreement’ together with ‘anadequate peacebuilding response’ will result in ‘lasting peace’. Second, a negative example(Somalia) will show the absence of ‘lasting peace’ where there only is a ‘signing of a peaceagreement’ but a lack of ‘an adequate peacebuilding response’. Why qualitative researchshould present negative cases is to give a more nuanced picture of the problem and provide fora stronger evidence for causality of variables then when only presenting positive cases.24Ideational analysisThe Sida framework states that a third step should assess possible impacts of engagements byanalysing strategies and options.25 When the task is to study a policy, the method mostcommonly used is policy analysis. The main reason why policy analysis will not be used in thisstudy is because there is no exact policy. Also, because of the actuality of the problem wecannot examine the entire process; from problem to decision to implementation.26 Anotherpossible method for studying policy documents is ideational analysis.27 Ideational analysis cantake different directions, it can be based on contents with focus on logic and argumentationbut it can also be based on the study of the existence of ideas.28 This study will go further fromthe focus of logic and argumentation in order to trace the ideas of a policy and motive forexisting methods. In line with this objective we can either study ideas in general, in a particulardebate, on a specific issue, and in a political area, or we can focus on the ideas of a certaingroup or actor. These different objectives can also be combined,29 i.e. the specific ideas of aspecific actor in a specific political area. That would be, in this case, how the UN expresses itspeacebuilding objective in order to create durable peace.22 Compare to Sida (2006) p. 12-1323 See for example Skocpol (1979). pp. 3624 Mahoney, James & Goertz, Gary (2004) The Possibility Principle: Choosing Negative Cases in Comparative Research AmericanPolitical Science Review, vol. 98, issue 4, p. 65325 Sida (2006) p. 13-1526 Premfors, Rune (1989) Policyanalys Studentlitteratur: Lund, Vedung, Evert (1977) Det rationella politiska samtalet- Hur politiskabudskap, tolkas, ordnas och prövas Aldus/Bonniers: Stockholm27 Bergström, Göran & Boréus, Kristina (1999) Textens mening och makt- metodbok i samhällsvetenskaplig textanalysStudentlitteratur: Lund, p. 9128 Bergström & Boréus (1999) p. 154. Compare to Vedung (1977)29 Bergström & Boréus (1999) p. 154 12 Ideational analysis can draw on tools such as ideal types. These are associated with MaxWeber and constitute models for thought constructions or experiments.30 It is importantthough to point out that ideal types are not models of reality but work as analytical tools withthe purpose to distinguish between certain characteristics and reconstruct system of ideas. Thedevelopment of ideal types requires a political-theoretical framework, in order to fit both thetheoretical approach, the research questions and the empirical material. Usually, the idealtypes enter the study in a quite late stage, where they work as a strainer structuring the alreadyexposed empirical material into a kind of clusters. The empirical material, results and analysiswill not be separated but treated together in order to clarify the connection between these.Selection & MaterialThe reason why the case study will focus on the three field sites Mozambique, Somalia andBurundi, is because they have a certain number of characteristics in common. They are allsituated in the south-east part of Africa, they are all post-colonial states, and they have been orstill are affected by civil war. However, even if they have these things in common theseconflicts are not dependent or related to each other. A word should also be said about the theoretical material. It can appear as not veryrecent, but after an extensive literature review I realised that the early literature onpeacebuilding, for example Galtung, Paris, Mial and Ramsbotham, still today remain the mainreferences for researchers. In addition, very few have come up with new findings of relativeinterest for the debate on peacebuilding. Instead, today’s peace researchers rather seem tohave operationalised the theoretical debate focusing on analysing practical cases, specificissues or recommendations for peacebuilding. The empirical material used in this study origins from mainly two kinds of sources. Theconflict analyses are based on reporting from the field. It is important to notice that theconflict analyses on Mozambique and Somalia will, in order to provide for historicalcomparisons, only take into consideration actions taken prior to the operationalisation of thePeacebuilding Commission in 2006. The Somalia conflict analysis is to a large extent based onthe International Crisis Group reporting and the Mozambique section is based on UN material.The Burundi conflict analysis mainly draws on reporting from Sida, BBC and the SwedishMinistry for Foreign Affairs (UD). The comparative historical analysis will be based on theabove mentioned material (since there is no peacebuilding policy) but the ideational analysis30 Ibid. p. 158-159 13on the other hand will be based on the policy documents, resolutions, statements and strategicframework guiding the Burundi Peacebuilding Commission.31Research strategyThe principal perspective that this study adopts is somewhat connected to a structuralistapproach. However, it is important to highlight that some normative elements might havefound its way into this approach. At the end of the day, policy analysis is always normative.The aspiration is nevertheless to be as neutral as possible. Further, the aim of this study is notto simply dwell at the technical information consisting of the description or the explanation ofa certain event or phenomena. The approach is rather to try to understand and interpret whatthese findings actually have to say. Once the problem is described, explained and understood,we should draw advantage of this knowledge and ask what we can do with this understanding.A critical approach can permit further evaluation and attempt for prediction. Finally, theresearch strategy is rather deductive, departing from existing theoretical literature, testing anempirical case. However, there are obvious inductive elements since there is no absolutepredetermined theory. The case study will show the possible validity of the theoreticaldiscussion and may therefore help to develop a more full-fledged theory.StructureThe structure of the study is to some extent inspired by the OECD framework for evaluatingconflict prevention and peacebuilding activities. The OECD underlines a set of preconditionsfor how to successfully evaluate peacebuilding activities in order to localise what actuallycontributes to peace and what does not.32 The study will therefore be conducted in severalsteps: First, it is important to establish relevant objectives; this has been done by theintroductory chapter. Second, stating an explicit theory will allow for relevant analysis; aframework concerning the theoretical debate on peacebuilding will be thoroughly outlined: Inwhat terms have the debate concerning peacebuilding been proceeding over the last decades?Third, completing conflict analyses will provide for a solid basis; the theoretical debate will beillustrated by two conflict analyses related to the UN’s earlier experiences in Mozambique andSomalia: How has the United Nations handled its peacebuilding task in various conflictsituations over time? Methodological validity will be enhanced by developing indicators inaccordance with the theoretical framework; a comparison of the Mozambique and Somaliaconflict analyses will provide for a set of ideal types: What have been the international31 For more detailed information and summary of the policy documents, see the second section of the Burundi chapter as well asthe last section of the bibliography.32 OECD (2008) p. 9 14community’s weaknesses and strengths in these cases? Fourth, focus should be on strategy andpolicy coherence; an analysis of the Burundi conflict and peace process will be carried out withspecial attention to the contribution of the Peacebuilding Commission: Can we argue that theUN Peacebuilding Commission for Burundi has contributed to better accomplish the UNspeacebuilding mission? Fifth, the final task is to conduct a systematic rigorous evaluation; theresults of the study will be discussed in the light of the theoretical framework and researchquestion: Has the UN Peacebuilding Commission enhanced the United Nations’ ability to fulfilits peacebuilding role? Here, we will also briefly discuss the possible implications of the resultsand analysis: What consequences this could have for the future role of the UN.3333 OECD (2008) p. 24 152. A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR PEACEBUILDINGThe purpose of this chapter is to present a theoretical framework for peacebuilding bydiscussing in what terms the debate concerning peacebuilding has been proceeding over the lastdecades. A brief discussion on different approaches to institutional, governance andpolicymaking theory will provide for a basic introduction. Thereafter, major attention will bepaid to the definition of conflict resolution and the critique of current peacebuilding beforedebating the contents of a possible new paradigm for UN peacebuilding.2.1. The rise, design, change & decline of institutionsHow can we best understand the process of UN reform?This research project adopts a synthesised perspective on institutions for a more integratedview on institutions.34 It can be very useful not primarily focusing on contrasting perspectivesbut rather on different perspectives as links in a chain explaining the rise, design, change ordecline of institutions. For example, rational institutionalism usually argue that an institutionthat no longer lives up to the initial expectations and thus has become ineffectiveautomatically either should reform itself or be dissolved.35 How then explain the phenomenonthat many institutions actually “hang in” and seem to be relatively difficult to change?Historical institutionalism has attempted to explain this by demonstrating the frequentoccurrence of institutional resistance to reform and the tendency towards rather promotingstability.36How can the institutionalisation and design of collective security be described?Rational institutionalism was for long the dominant perspective for institutional analysis andwas primarily considered to be successful in explaining the emergence and structure ofinstitutions. Institutional change was considered being automatic since the institution's designwas based on the functions it was expected to perform and that institutions survive thanks tothe benefits they generate. Effective institutional change and development is, therefore, whenplayers react to the sub-optimal outcome.3734 Hall, Peter A. & Rosemary C. R. Taylor (1996) Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms Political Studies 44, p. 955-957 and Pierson, Paul (1996) The Path to the European Integration: A Historical Institutionalist Analysis Comparative PoliticalStudies, vol. 29, no.2, p. 142-14335 Peters, Guy B. (2005) Institutional Theory in Political Science ‘The New Institutionalism’ Continuum, p. 61-6236 Pierson (1996), p. 142-14337 Peters (2005), p. 61-62 16How can the development and change within the UN system be explained?Many have argued that sociological institutionalism in greater extent provide for a validexplanation of institutional change and how it can be operationalised. It can be suitable forthis purpose by emphasizing the diversity of actors in the institution-building process. Fromsociological point of view there is a broad criticism of how political action often is reduced torational utility calculations. Instead they point at the importance of the norm-guidedbehaviour based on a strong sense of legitimacy, meaning and interpretation.38 Organisationsare seen as loosely linked together by supporting already established informal codes as socialnorms and formal rules being codified by the organisations.39 There is a strong desire toimitate, to fit in, to cooperate, and to develop common standards.40How can the UN’s peacebuilding role best be enhanced?Traditional governance theory has focused on elected policy makers, hierarchical control,state-centered management and formal political institutions. It advocates a clear top-downgovernance and has been closely related to setting standards for public services. ‘New’ modelsfor governance (network governance etc) is rather non-hierarchical in nature, where private-public interaction (state, market and civil society consultation) participate in socially inclusiveeffects. None of the actors alone can solve the problem, it can only be done throughcooperation.41 However, for the process to be legitimate and effective it requires a degree ofmeta-governance.42 A ‘collaborative dialogue’ is an approach aiming at safeguarding pluralismand diversity in policy making through establishing creative solutions that relatively wellresponds to the interests of the involved actors. It increases the possibility for actors to learnabout the other’s needs and skills,43 by focusing on issues such as communication, legitimacy,diversity, equality of conditions, confidence and responsibility.4438 Se for example March, James G. & Johan P. Olsen (1984) The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political LifeAmerican Political Science Review 78 (3), p.73439 Jacobsson, Kerstin (2004) Soft regulation and the subtle transformation of states: the case of EU employment policy Journal ofEuropean Social Policy, vol.14, no.4, p. 355, 359-36140 Ibid.41 DiMaggio, Paul J. och Walter W. Powell (1983) The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective RationalityAmerican Sociological Review 48 (2), p. 16942 Sørensen, Eva och Jacob Torfing (2008) Theories of Democratic Network Governance Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 7-15,Hajer, M & H. Wagenaar (2003) Deliberative Policy Analysis. Understanding Governance in the Network Society Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, p. 4-643 Sørensen & Torfing (2008), p. 10644 Innes, J. & D. Booher (2003) Collaborative policymaking: governance through dialogue in Hajer, M & H. Wagenaar (2003)Deliberative Policy Analysis. Understanding Governance in the Network Society Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 37-46 172.2. Defining conflict resolutionSince the end of the Cold War, the world has seen a multiplication of violent intra-stateconflicts and complex political emergencies. Consequently, pressure has increased on theinternational community to act at all stages of conflict: pre-, during- and post-conflict. KofiAnnan points out the necessity of making “conflict prevention the cornerstone of collectivesecurity in the twenty-first century”.45 But when prevention fails and violent conflict is a fact,there is a number of mechanisms to manage the situation. Already in the 60s Galtungdistinguished between three approaches to peace; peacekeeping (“to halt and reduce themanifest violence of the conflict through intervention of military forces...”), peacemaking(“directed at reconciling political attitudes through mediation, negotiation, arbitration andconciliation”) and peacebuilding (“the practical implementation of peaceful social changethrough socio-economic reconstruction and development”).46 When discussing conflict resolution it is also important to distinguish between positiveand negative peace. Positive peace is often defined as the removal of structural and culturalviolence while negative peace simply refers to the cessation of direct violence.47 Similarly, thedefinitions of on the one hand conflict settlement and on the other conflict resolution can berelated to these two opposing discourses. Conflict settlement is normally referred to as thesigning of a peace agreement ending violence, while conflict resolution in addition refers to thecreation of conditions for genuine and lasting peace.Multiple approaches to conflict resolutionIt has been argued that conflict can be managed in three possible ways; through violence andwar, by justice and law, or through diplomacy and negotiation.48 However, most scholars agreethat the most suitable way of intervening in a conflict is through some kind of negotiationwithout resorting to arms.49 Among all the methods of peaceful settlement, mediation hasfigured most prominently. A rather simple but broad definition of mediation is “the activesearch for a negotiated settlement to an international or intrastate conflict by an impartialthird party”.50 What third parties can do in a conflict can be classified into two majorparadigms; the structural and the social-psychological paradigm.5145 Report of the Secretary-General (2001) Prevention of armed conflict, United Nations General AssemblySecurity Council, 2001A/55/985-S/2001/57446 Galtung (1975), p.282-30447 Galtung (1990) p.291-30548 Bigo, Didier at a lecture at Sciences Po Paris during spring term 2003.49 Bercovitch, Jacob (2002) Studies in International Mediation, Palgrave Macmillan, p.350 Berridge, G.R. (2002, 2nd edition) Diplomacy- Theory and Practice, Palgrave: Basingstoke, p.18851 Crocker, Osler Hampson & Aall (2002) Two’s Company but Is There a Crowd? Some Hypotheses about Multiparty Mediation inBercovitch Studies in International Mediation, Palgrave Macmillan, p.232 18 The structural paradigm is a more traditional model of mediation where the conflictingparties are led to and trough a negotiated settlement through persuasion, muscles, incentivesand disincentives. The causes of conflict are seen as objective where timing, ripeness andmutual hurting stalemate are crucial elements for success. Official mediation by states, inparticular great powers, is regarded as ideal. 52 The agent of this approach is often referred to as‘track one’ with the main purpose to restore status quo. The social-psychological approach rather focuses on communication and exchange as away to change perceptions and attitudes that can lead to reconciliation. This approach is muchmore unofficial in character where the mediators often are academics and the negotiatingparties not necessarily representatives from the top hierarchy. Problem-solving workshopsexplore different options in creating more open channels of communication.53 The agent ofthis approach is often referred to as ‘track two’ where changing status quo is more important. Crocker et al. synthesise these two paradigms and point out that certain mediators andmethods of mediation might be more successful in some conflicts than in others, and that it isunreasonable that one single strategy could deal with them all. Sometimes even more than onemediator may be required to manage a conflict. Further, mediation might be necessary atmany different stages of a conflict.54 This multi-party mediation is often referred to as ‘multi-track diplomacy’55 which is based on the original distinction made by Joseph Montville“between official, governmental actions to resolve conflicts (track one) and unofficial efforts bynongovernmental professionals to resolve conflicts within and between states (track two)”. Theterm ‘multi-track diplomacy’, was thereafter highlighted by Louise Diamond recognising thecomplexity of the term. 56 Multi-track diplomacy has been defined as “track one [and] tracktwo, addressing elites and grass roots, operating at structural-constitutional as well as atrelational-community levels, with cooperation between involved international and internalagencies”.57Methods for conflict resolutionWe have studied different models for successful mediation but what determines the outcomeof a mediation process? According to Bercovitch’s contingency model of mediation theoutcome of the mediation is dependent on both the context and the process itself. His52 Ibid. p.232-233, Zartman, William (1995) Elusive Peace: Negotiating an End to Civil War The Brookings Institution, p.196-19753 Kelman, Herbert (2002) Interactive Problem-solving: Informal Mediation by the Scolar-Practioner in Bercovitch (2002) Studies inInternational Mediation, Palgrave Macmillan, p.167-173, Crocker (2002) p.233-234, 23654 Crocker (2002), p.236-23755 Crocker, Osler Hampson & Aall (1999) Herding Cats: Multiparty Mediation in a Complex World, USIP, p.556 James Notter & Louise Diamond (1996) Building Peace and Transforming Conflict: Multi-Track Diplomacy in Practice, OccasionalPaper Number 7, p. 6-757 Miall, Ramsbotham & Woodhouse (1999) Contemporary Conflict Resolution: The Prevention, Management and Transformation ofDeadly Conflicts, Polity, p. 19 19determinants for successful mediation are the following: The context tells us about the natureof the dispute, the parties and the mediators. Thereafter, the process itself tells us about themediation behaviour. The nature of these two leads us to the outcomes of mediation: Successor failure? 58 If mediation has been successful, implementation of the agreement is necessary. Miall etal. point out that it is very important to distinguish between positive and negative peace whenwe discuss post-settlement peacebuilding. The ‘negative’ task is to prevent a relapse into warand the ‘positive’ to construct a self-sustainable peace.59 The first task could be identified aswhat we usually label peacekeeping, while the latter rather is a form of long-termpeacebuilding. Concerning the first task, it might be possible to argue that the internationalcommunity has been relatively successful. As many conflicts still persist it is obvious that thesecond task has been more problematical.60UN post-settlement peacebuildingIn 1992, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali published An Agenda for Peace, with purpose tooutline the future objectives of UN preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacebuilding andpeacekeeping activities. He described peacebuilding as an “action to identify and supportstructures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse intoconflict”61. This definition encompasses rehabilitation, reconstruction, and conflict prevention,and legitimises outside intervention in order to establish the ultimate goal of sustainablesecurity and peace. The fundamental idea of peacebuilding is an action to identify and solidifypeace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict. The UN points out however, that it is importantto highlight that peacebuilding is an approach to conflict prevention, with the necessity toaddress the political, economic, social, military, humanitarian, human rights, environmental,cultural and demographic causes of conflict. Furthermore, in Supplement to An Agenda forPeace, Boutros-Ghali envisaged that peacebuilding would initially be undertaken bymultifunctional UN operations, and then handed over to civilian agencies and finallytransferred to local agents.62 However, the United Nations is still today at the early stages of their experience on thelevel of post-settlement intervention, which entails peacebuilding, rehabilitation anddevelopment of war-shattered societies. More specifically, today’s post-settlement measures58 Bercovitch (2002), p. 221-22259 Miall et al. (1999), p.186-187, 19460 Ibid. p.200-20261 Report of the Secretary-General (1992) An Agenda for Peace - Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping, UnitedNations Security Council A/47/277 - S/24111, § 2162 Report of the Secretary-General (1995) Supplement to an agenda for peace, United Nations Security Council A/50/60 - S/1995/1, §81-96 20includes: disarmament, restoration of order, repatriating refugees, security, elections,promotion of human rights, strengthening governmental institutions, promoting politicalparticipation, and constructing civil society.632.3. Critique of current peace building paradigmThe last decades of the 20th century presented two different trends in international politics. Atthe same time as an increase in violent conflict resulted in civil intra-state wars, there was agrowing emphasis on individual human rights and human security increasing the number ofinterventions in the affairs of other countries for humanitarian purpose. Since the mid-90s,governments, international, regional and local organisations have adopted an even morecomprehensive view on conflict and have identified the need for a multifaceted approachsupporting peace in post-settlement situations in order to avoid the recurrence of violence. Within this context, the theory and practice of a peacebuilding paradigm emerged,which to a large extent was resting on UN peacekeeping experience.64 However, traditionalpeacekeeping did not offer adequate organisational and conceptual guidance for UN’s newpeacebuilding role in seeking to remake a state’s political institutions, security forces andeconomic arrangements.65 Paris argues that liberal internationalism has been the singleparadigm for peacebuilding. It is based on the assumption that the surest foundation for peaceis liberal democracy and market economy. Paradoxically, this attempt to pacification has oftengenerated destabilising side effects.66 Roland Paris argues that this approach is flawed andproposes a “strategic liberalisation” approach: First, the process of democratisation must bemore gradual and controlled and elections should never be held before passions have cooled.Second, electoral arrangements must reward moderation and not extremism. Third, it isimportant to promote equitable growth-oriented adjustment policies. Fourth, effective centralco-ordinating bodies must be created. Fifth, the duration of operations should be extended.Without these reforms, parties might be convinced to stop fighting for the time being, butthere is little prospect of achieving peace after civil conflict in the long run and so fulfilling thesecond task ‘creating self-sustainable peace’.67 Many other conflict resolution researchers, joins63 Miall et al. (1999), p. 200-20264 Abiew, FK & T. Keating (2000) Outside Agents and the Politics of Peacebuilding and Reconciliation, International Journal,Toronto: vol. 55, no. 1, p. 80-10665 Bertram, Eva (1995) Reinventing Governments: The Promise and Perils of United Nations Peace Building, Journal of ConflictResolution, vol.39, no.3, p.389-39066 Paris, Roland (1997) Peacebuilding: The Limits of Liberal Institutionalism, International Security vol. 22, no.2, p.5667 Ibid. p.58, 81-89, Compare to de Zeeuw (2001), p. 26-29 21in on the critique of the liberal internationalist agenda. I will here be highlighting the mostcritical issues.68State-centric top-down approachThere has been a tendency to adopt a state-centric top-down approach which neglects smallerNGOs, local agents and indigenous resources and other actors that illustrate ‘peacebuildingfrom below’. Traditional track one approaches, i.e. mediation by political elites, has normallybeen used in inter-state conflicts but can be less effective or even irrelevant in intra-stateconflicts.69 The UN has often been criticised of ignoring the potential for bottom-up grassroots approaches in favour for hierarchical and formal political structures.70 The academicworld has also been criticised for its concentration on elite level track one diplomacy and thatit rarely focus on important community-based track two initiatives, i.e. grass roots mediationhighlighting the indispensable ingredients of civil society.71 Miall et al. point out that it isironic that, still, conflicts reflecting the weakening of state structure to a large extent rely onthe involvement of international institutions based on the system of state sovereignty. It is notsurprising that the international community struggles to find appropriate and effectivemeans.72External interventionIntervention is traditionally conducted by external actors. This has brought with it a lack ofappreciation and encouragement of national and local empowerment initiatives. Researchersemphasise the importance of a strong national ownership and an active civil society to theconsolidation of democracy, especially with regard to countries where there has been anabsence of traditions of independent civic engagement and a widespread tendency towardspassive reliance on the state. 73Short time-frame for negative peaceThere has been a tendency to think that a peace agreement is equivalent to peace. It isimportant to highlight that the concepts ‘peace settlement’ and ‘conflict resolution’ are not68 See for example Ramsbotham, Oliver (2000) Reflections on UN Post-Settlement Peacebuilding in Woodhouse & RamsbothamPeacekeeping and Conflict Resolution, Frank Cass & Co Ltd, p. 178-179. Compare to OECD (2008), p. 18, de Zeeuw(2001), p. 19-2469 Heinrich, Wolfgang (1997) Building the Peace, Life & Peace Institute, p. Iv,70 Duffey, Tamara (2000) Cultural Issues in Contemporary Peacekeeping in Woodhouse & Ramsbotham Peacekeeping and ConflictResolution, Frank Cass & Co Ltd, p. 16171 Cochrane, F (2000) Beyond the Political Elites: A Comparative Analysis of the Roles and Impacts of Community-Based NGOs inConflict Resolution Activity, Civil Wars vol. 3 no.2, p. 1-22. See also Orjuela, Camilla (2003) Building Peace in Sri Lanka: A Role forCivil Society? Journal of Peace Research vol. 40 no. 2, p. 19672 Miall et al. (2002), p. 19, 7273 Putnam, Robert (1995) Bowling Alone: America’s Declining Social Capital Journal of Democracy vol. 6 no. 1, p. 65 22interchanmgable. Focus has to a large extent rested on a negative peace definition where thefirst task ‘cessation of violence’, often has been regarded as conflict resolved.74 This is linked tothe argument that there is often a foreshortened timeframe.75 Building genuine peace takestime and is not an enterprise that can be rushed. This is perhaps why many of the UNpeacebuilding missions have been argued as failures, but in reality they have perhaps not yetcome to an ‘end’.A western perspectiveAnother criticism is the lack of a cultural approach to peacebuilding. As Paris has argued,peacebuilding is founded on liberal institutionalism which is an entirely western invention. 76This western culture is not necessarily suitable for a non-western country. For example, it hasbeen argued that the UN often has failed to acknowledge the fact that traditionalreconciliation takes a considerable amount of time in certain cultures.77Politico- military focusFurther, the focus of peacebuilding missions concentrates often on military and politicaldimensions at the expense of psycho-social aspects, which to a large extent have beenneglected. However, healing the psycho-social scars of war has always been central to thoseworking in the field. It is important to bear in mind that the physical effects are much easier totreat than the invisible psychological wounds.782.4. Towards a new peacebuilding paradigmIn line with Paris’ argument that the liberal internationalist approach is deeply flawed and thatthere is a need for an agenda based on ‘strategic liberalisation’, Miall et al. presents guidelineshighlighting the most important elements for peacebuilding. They argue that conflictresolution in intra-state conflicts makes its most distinctive contributions when we moveprogressively from the military-security towards the psycho-social dimensions of post-settlement peacebuilding, from short to long-term, and from state centrism towards societallevels.7974 See for example Miall et al. (1999), p. 186-19475 Ramsbotham (2000), p. 17976 Paris (1997), p. 5677 Duffey (2000), p. 16278 Miall et al. (1999), p. 200-209. See also Ramsbotham (2000), p. 17879 Miall et al. (1999) pp. 211, 215 23 However, except for the discussion above, there has been little debate on the liberaluniversalist assumptions and what the alternatives might be.80 What is needed is an approachthat respects and takes into account the criticisms of the peacebuilding paradigm mentionedabove. However, this section will not necessarily proclaim the exclusive use of ideal forms ofpeacebuilding but rather on the neglected aspects that we need to focus on today, in order tofind methods for peacebuilding consisting of truly multiple activities, multiple roles, atmultiple levels.81 An introduction to this approach could be illustrated by the twelve principlesof multi-track diplomacy expressed by van Tongeren. Drawing on the critique of currentparadigm, following are the most important lessons learned for an effective and successfulfuture peacebuilding:82Multi-track diplomacyIt is important to “involve as many people and sectors as possible” in peacebuilding.83 Multi-track diplomacy is an approach which combines track one and track two approaches.84However, Miall et al. argue that the primary responsibility always should lie within the affectedstate even if outsiders are inevitably involved. They call for a shift from a primary responsibilityof external agencies toward an appreciation of indigenous or internal third parties. However,third party interventions should be multi-track and address both elites and grass roots, that isdifferent actors operating at different levels.85 Lederach’s peacebuilding triangle describes thevarious levels of society that must be included simultaneously in peacebuilding andreconciliation processes. Those are top-level, middle-range and grass roots leadership.86 Multi-track diplomacy must therefore be careful not to neglect or pay less attention totrack two initiatives such as non-governmental, non-state actors including various types ofNGOs, associations, groups and engaged individuals.87 Its activities vary from problem-solvingworkshops, providing messengers and setting up dialogue between antagonistic communities8880 Ramsbotham (2000) p. 17981 Lederach, John Paul (1999) Just peace in The European Centre for Conflict Prevention, The International Fellowship ofReconciliation (IFOR) & The Coexistence Initiative of State of the World Forum in People Building Peace: 35 Inspiring Stories FromAround the World (1999) Utrecht: International Books; Chipping Norton: Jon Carpenter, p. 3582 van Tongeren, Paul (1999) Reflections on Peacebuilding in The European Centre for Conflict Prevention, The InternationalFellowship of Reconciliation (IFOR) & The Coexistence Initiative of State of the World Forum in People Building Peace: 35 InspiringStories From Around the World (1999) Utrecht: International Books; Chipping Norton: Jon Carpenter, p. 124, 12883 Ibid. p. 12484 Ibid. p. 12885 Miall et al. (2002) pp. 72-76. See also Orjuela (2003) p. 19786 Lederach, John Paul (1995) Preparing for Peace: Conflict Transformation Across Cultures, Syracuse University Press, p. 9-25. Seealso Lederach (1999), p. 3687 Ibid. p. 12. See also Havermans, Jos (1999) Private Professions for Peace in The European Centre for Conflict Prevention, TheInternational Fellowship of Reconciliation (IFOR) & The Coexistence Initiative of State of the World Forum in People BuildingPeace: 35 Inspiring Stories From Around the World (1999) Utrecht: International Books; Chipping Norton: Jon Carpenter, p. 16688 Havermans (1999), p. 168 24and it has therefore an ability to develop mutual understanding between larger groups ofpeople since it is not limited to the sphere of the politician.89Local empowermentIt is important to “[s]trengthen local capabilities for peace and include local authorities”.90 Thisdecentralised approach91 empowers peacebuilders for local and national action so they canassist in making peace from inside out.92 It is argued that an active civil society creates co-operation, trust, inclusiveness and open debate, which in the long run can create peace andharmony between earlier opposed parties. The quality of public life and the performance ofsocial institutions are powerfully influenced by norms and networks of civic engagement, andare therefore more likely to have successful outcomes in civilly engaged communities.93 Enhancing civil society’s role in peacebuilding will at the same time lay the foundationsfor future conflict prevention.94 Civil society intervention is suitable as a conflict resolutionmechanism because “sustainable peace can only be found within local, social and culturalcontext”. Peacebuilding efforts can only be made sustainable by the people themselves and theexternal mediator should be limited “to act as a facilitator, strengthening locally initiatedefforts of peace and democracy”.95 Again, it is important that the actors of each society areowners of the peace process. If peace is expected to be sustainable it can never be enforcedfrom the outside but only grow from the inside.96Long-term process for positive peaceIt is important to “[c]onceive peacebuilding and reconciliation as a process”.97 It can never berushed and has to be long-term since “[p]eace is a long-term change process based onrelationship building”.98 Together with this long-term perspective, peacebuilding must alwaysbe tied to a positive definition of peace.99 Peacebuilding as in An Agenda for Peace refers towhat other researchers more adequately have defined as a post-settlement “socialreconstruction in sustaining peace” that must encompass “the full array of stages and89 Ibid. p. 16690 van Tongeren (1999), p. 12491 Ibid. p. 12592 Diamond, Louise (1999) Multi-Track Diplomacy in the 21st Century in The European Centre for Conflict Prevention, TheInternational Fellowship of Reconciliation (IFOR) & The Coexistence Initiative of State of the World Forum People Building Peace:35 Inspiring Stories From Around the World (1999) Utrecht : International Books ; Chipping Norton : Jon Carpenter, p. 84-8593 Putnam (1995), p. 6794 Orjuela (2003) p. 197. See also Last, David (2000) Organizing for Effective Peacebuilding in Woodhouse & RamsbothamPeacekeeping and Conflict Resolution, Frank Cass & Co Ltd, p. 8595 Heinrich (1997), p. xi-xii96 Heinrich (1997), p. 1897 van Tongeren (1999), p. 12498 Lederach (1999), p. 3599 Fetherston, A.B. (2000) Theoretical Frameworks for Peacekeeping in Woodhouse & Ramsbotham Peacekeeping and ConflictResolution, Frank Cass & Co Ltd, p. 201 25approaches needed to transform conflict toward sustainable, peaceful relationships andoutcomes”.100Cultural sensitivityFurther, is it possible to build a ‘western peace’ according to western rules and methods innon-western countries? Is a universal or generic approach to peacebuilding possible or mustcultural differences be taken into account?101 Recently, it has been argued that a more culture-sensitive approach to peacebuilding is needed, i.e. a western model should not necessarily beimposed in a non-western culture. This entails taking into account and respecting indigenousconflict resolution mechanisms and traditions, which hopefully will be more suitable for thatparticular society, and therefore will peace has a more realistic chance to last.102Psycho-social approach for transformationThere are three major deficits in war-shattered countries corresponding to the keycomponents of the UN’s peacebuilding task: Political-constitutional incapacity, economic-social debilitation and psycho-social trauma.103 However, the often neglected psycho-socialdimension must be paid greater attention. Establishing respect for human rights, developmentof civil society within genuine political communities together with healing psychologicalwounds and other long term reconciliation aspects are crucial tasks.104 However, we must remember that it is very delicate and time-consuming to treatpsychological injuries.105 Peacebuilding must therefore aim at social-psychological change andtransforming attitudes through dialogue.106 It is therefore crucial to “[c]hange and transformthe conflict pattern”, i.e. breaking the logic of war and building hope humanising the enemy.107Unjust social relationships can be transforming through raising awareness, addressing publicopinion, bringing ethnic groups together, building trust, encouraging dialogue and fosteringdemocratic society.108 Healing is the key to conflict transformation as well as toreconciliation.109 The purpose of the latter is to “to rebuild a more liveable, and psychologicallyhealthy environment between former enemies where the vicious cycle of hate, deep suspicion,100 Heinrich (1997), p. 9101 Ramsbotham (2000), p. 179102 Ibid. p. 199103 Ramsbotham (2000) p. 181104 Ibid. p. 182. See also Last (2000), p. 86105 Miall et al. (1999), p. 200-209. See also Ramsbotham (2000), p. 178106 Heinrich (1997), p. xi. See also Maoz, Ifat An Experiment in Peace: Reconciliation-Aimed Workshops of Jewish-Israeli andPalestinian Youth (2000) Journal of Peace Research vol. 37 no. 6, p. 721107 van Tongeren (1999), p. 125108 Miall et al. (2002), p. 21, Heinrich (1997), p. 4-5. See also Lederach (1995), p. 8 and Orjuela (2003), p. 208-209109 Diamond (1999), p. 83 26resentment, and revenge does not continue to foster”.110 Reconciliation activities may includesthe acknowledging of harm and injury, sincere regrets, a readiness to apologise, not repeatinginjury, efforts to redress and compensate causes of conflict, and creating new relationships.111110 Assefa, Hizkias (1999) The Meaning of Reconciliation in The European Centre for Conflict Prevention, The InternationalFellowship of Reconciliation (IFOR) & The Coexistence Initiative of State of the World Forum People Building Peace: 35 InspiringStories From Around the World (1999) Utrecht : International Books ; Chipping Norton : Jon Carpenter, p. 44111 Ibid. p. 42 273. ILLUSTRATING UN PEACEBUILDINGThis section will illustrate the theoretical debate by answering to the question; How has theUnited Nations handled its peacebuilding task in various conflict situations over time? Theempirical material will be presented, structured and analysed according to the ideal types. Twoconflict analyses will be carried out related to the UN’s earlier experiences in Mozambique andSomalia. A comparison of the two will answer to the question What has been the internationalcommunity’s weaknesses and strengths in these cases? As you will see, roughly, the first of eachpair of ideal types has often been associated with the Somalia case while the last often has beenused while explaining the peace process in Mozambique. This section will give us an all-embracing perspective on the possibilities for conflict resolution and will provide for solidbasis for the next chapter.3.1. From violent conflict to peaceBackground & conflict dynamicsThe main stages of the process from war to peace are regarded as escalation and de-escalation.Escalation is the prerequisite for a minor conflict or dispute turning into armed conflict oreven war. This phenomenon is often associated with the dynamic perspective that focuses onan actor’s reactions to another actor’s behaviour. It is precisely that process which leads to anegative spiral intensifying the conflict.112 The main proponents of this perspective point outthat this ‘dynamic’ escalation easily can become self-sustaining, where an even heavier conflictbehaviour will change structures at several levels.113 The conflict escalates (if no change inpositive direction occurs) until the stage where the parties can not proceed any further. Thisphenomenon is known as ‘hurting stalemate’, when the conflict has reached a point where thesituation is very painful for one or both parties. However, this stalemate can lead to a ‘ripemoment’, the point where the parties are ready and willing to negotiate a solution.114Negotiations & peace agreementAccording to Stedman the main barriers that might hinder the way to a peace agreement aresecurity dilemmas, indivisible issues, pathological leadership and mobilization rhetoric.Involvement of a mediating third party can also create problems if the approach is not well112 Wallensteen, Peter (2002) Understanding Conflict Resolution: War, Peace and the Global System, Sage Publications London,pp.34113 See Rubin, Jeffrey (1994) Social Conflict- Escalation, Stalemate and Settlement McGraw-Hill: New York114 Zartman (1995), p.8 28adapted.115 So what determines the outcome of a mediation process? According to Bercovitchthe success criteria are a contextual understanding of the conflict issue, the parties and themediator, but also the actual mediation behaviour.116 If the negotiations result in a peaceagreement, it is considered the main breaking point and a crucial factor for conflict resolution.Of highest importance is the contents of the peace agreement, the period after the signature,power division, and peacebuilding and reconciliation processes.117Implementation & lasting peaceAccording to Wallensteen is the most important task in achieving sustainable peace after thesigning of an agreement is whether there is a successful reconstruction of the political systemand to remedy the security dilemma.118 Democratisation in combination with power-sharingare considered to be suitable methods of multi-ethnic states, where the decision-making bodyshould consist of representatives from all different groups to create incentives for cooperationacross borders.119 Kaufmann, however, argues that integration is only a theoretical utopia andthat it is more realistic to establish homogeneous enclaves organised in a federal system.120Stedman identifies the main challenges as those connected to the initial conflict issues. It istherefore an enormous challenge in itself to create a truly legitimate peace agreement.121During the implementation phase, it is important to return to the distinction between positiveand negative peace. Is the purpose to avoid the recurrence of violence or is it to lay thefoundations for a process of lasting peace?122 At this stage Wallensteen puts a great emphasison the international community's role in general and the UN in particular.123115 Stedman, Stephen (1996) Negotiation and Mediation in Civil Wars in Brown, Michael The International Dimensions of InternalConflict, The MIT Press Cambridge MA, p. 343116 Bercovitch (1997), p.221-222117 Wallersteen (2002), p.53118 Ibid. p. 148119 Sisk, Timothy (1996) Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts, United Institute of Peace Washington DC, p.34-40120 Kaufmann, Chaim (1996) Possible and Impossible Solution to Ethnic Civil Wars, International Security, vol.20 nr.4, p. 158121 Stedman (1996), p. 303122 Miall et al. (1999), p. 186-187, 194123 Wallensteen (2002), p. 152 293.2. Somalia Conflict AnalysisBackground & conflict dynamicsContextUntil 1960 Somalia was divided in an Italian and a British Somaliland, but when they gainedtheir independence they merged and formed the Republic of Somalia. In 1970 Said Barreproclaimed a socialist state which he ruled in a despotic manner until he was driven out of thecountry in 1991. The Constitution of 1979 expired and the Republic of Somaliland in the north-western part of the country proclaimed its independence.124 Since then, the country has beendestroyed by permanent civil conflict.125 The country has witnessed many failed peace attempts, both peace operations (such asthe American “Black Hawk down” intervention in 1993 and the UN withdrawal in 1995) butalso numerous peace talks, conferences and diplomatic efforts led by key internationalplayers.126 In October 2004, a peace agreement finally succeeded to establish a transitionalgovernment, but unfortunately it was forced to operate from Kenya due to growing unrest.127However, the government has been incapable to fulfil its main task: state building, ensuringsecurity and creating national unity.128PartiesThe Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was established in 2004.129 It was dominated bythe Darod clan and unfortunately characterised by illegitimacy, inability to act, internaldivisions and widespread unpopularity.130 TFG was formally supported by the African Union(AU), the UN and the regional grouping the Inter-governmental Authority on Development(IGAD).131 The strongest support, however, came from Ethiopia, which was determined not to124 BBC News Country profile: Somalia http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/country_profiles/1072592.stm, Accessed in December2008125 Utrikesdepartementet (UD) Somalia http://www.regeringen.se/sb/d/2574/a/75151;jsessionid=aq0M1LzkQZlc , Accessed inDecember 2008126 Ibid. See also Grono, Nick Somalia: Nation on the Cusp of Chaos or Resurrection, The Australian, 8 January 2007, InternationalCrisis Group (ICG) Horn of Africa project http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=1166&l=1, Accessed December 2008127 UD Somalia128 ICG Horn of Africa project129 BBC News Country profile: Somalia130 Africa briefing N° 45, Somalia: The tough Part is Ahead, 26 January 2007, Africa Report N° 116, Can the Somali Crisis beContained? 10 August 2006131 See for example French Ministry for Foreign Affairs http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/pays-zones-geo_833/afrique_1063/organisations-regionales-africaines_404/igad_13136/igad_28693.html, Accessed in December 2008 30let their neighbouring country to establish an Islamic state.132 The US is considered to havesimilar motives and also Kenya has been accused of being biased.133 The Union of Islamic Courts was initially the umbrella organisation for those actorswishing to establish an Islamic state based on Sharia law.134 The Courts were led by SheikhSharif Ahmed and Hassan Dahir Aweys and dominated by the large Hawiye clan.135 During thefirst six-month period when the Courts ruled over Mogadishu it managed to establish law andorder.136 They report to have achieved some support from private individuals in Saudi Arabiaand the Gulf States, and therefore the TFG, Ethiopia and the US accuse them of cooperatingwith radical Islamists and al-Qaeda loyal groups. This is constantly denied by the Courts. Theyalso report receiving support from Eritrea, which is in constant conflict with Ethiopia (theCourts is also supporting rebels in Ethiopia).137 The Courts’ leaders contacted the UN, EU andUS aiming at establishing relations with the international community based on mutualrespect.138IncompatibilityThe core of the conflict has to do with actual power, prestige and clan issues rather thanideological struggle. TFG did show incapability to achieve its mission, that is to transform itselfinto a national unity government. At the same time the Courts had emerged as an oppositionplatform.139 This situation is considered to be the development of the increasingly dwindlingpower of local leadership in and around Mogadishu. This created a political vacuum that TFGunlike the Courts had been incapable to fill. On the contrary, for the first time in the lastfifteen years, one actor managed to overcome anarchy and total lawlessness in key regions.140Thus, the TFG had to take a more defensive position while the Courts played a more offensiverole.SymptomsThe fact that the TFG, because of inefficiency and unwillingness, was unable to pursue itsnational unity mission, implies that it has used its position in a discriminatory manner.132 BBC News Somalia: Who supports who?, 28 December 2006 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/5092586.stm , Accessed inDecember 2008133 Ibid.134 In June 2006 the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) changed its name to Supreme Islamic Courts Council (SICC). Since 2008 mainactors from SICC formed the Liberation Front Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS). In order to not create confusion byusing different abbreviations I will refer to this actor as ‘the Courts’.135 BBC News Country profile: Somalia, Africa briefing N° 45136 BBC News Somalia: Who supports who?137 Africa Report N° 116138 BBC News Somalia: Who supports who?139 Africa Report N° 116140 Ibid. 31Despite its lack of national legitimacy it nonetheless received a strong international supportand was relatively stable in terms of resources and capacity. It therefore tended to behave as ifits legitimacy was more widespread than it actually was among Somalis.141 The Courts’ strategy to combat their opponents has been constant threats of escalatingtheir guerrilla warfare. They also considered themselves to be a more legitimate and moreeffective leaders, which in itself is menace enough for a sitting government. Both parties hadsupport among the militias which ensured that they at any time could use violence tounderline their threats.142 Otherwise, it is important to point out that violence has really been the only strategy inthis conflict. Where the law of the jungle prevails, resulting in total anarchy with inadequateinstitutions and resources, threats as sanctions and discrimination seems to be rather paltryoptions. In this chaos, one party is described as a terrorist and extremist while the other, ratheris pictured as a bunch of week, useless, illegitimate politicians only running the errands of theinternational community.143Negotiations & peace agreementPower relationsThe power relations and resources that characterise this conflict are impossible to distinguishfrom the secondary parties’ involvement. The reason is mainly that severe poverty due tolimited internal resources has created a vast dependence on external aid. TFG has initially beena relatively weak player, however backed by the international community. The Courts wereinternally the stronger party but did only enjoy support from relatively invisible and smallplayers. It could be argued that the relationship between the parties was asymmetrical to theadvantage of the latter. However the TFG’s supporters were much stronger than the secondaryparties supporting the Courts. Ultimately, this lead to the conflict actually being relativelysymmetric. Nevertheless, the crisis has been fed by the international power game taking placeon several levels: Ethiopia would like to see their allies in power. Eritrea will do everything inits power to counter the Ethiopian influence in the region. Furthermore, the AU/IGADinitiative to send an international peacekeeping force in order to support the TFG ratherappears to be in line with US anti-terrorism or anti-Islamic measures. This has by the Courtsbeen regarded as direct attacks.144141 Ibid.142 Ibid.143 Ibid.144 Africa Report, N° 116 32DynamicsThe conflict is often defined as an identity conflict based on the complex system of strict clanaffiliation which characterises the Somali society. Each clan is struggling for greater power andnational influence in order to dominate the other rival clans and maximise their gains. Forexample, being a member of the government rather means being a representative for a specificclan and not a national representative.145 Moreover, the principle of survival has often been used as an explanatory model. This isclosely linked to poverty and class in which women and children are the most vulnerable.Therefore, unfortunately rivalries over resources is an everyday problem concerning both vitalresources like water and food (due to desert climate combined with many years of extremedrought) but also access to tax money and humanitarian assistance.146 This, in addition toreligious beliefs and the yearning for stability, is why many Somalis would be prepared toaccept a system based on a strict interpretation of Sharia law in exchange for guaranteed peaceand security. This does not exclude that the vast majority of Somalis oppose the principle ofIslamic Jihad and ideological extremism.147 However, the power struggle about who would best be placed to establish peace andorder in the chaos that has raged for over a decade still remains. Constant interference by thirdparties, through ‘mediation’ or other forms of intervention has often been biased actions of selfinterest as the US/Ethiopian fear for terrorism or the Eritrean’s will to beat its enemy or eventhe UN accepting them this behaviour. This has rather reinforced the conflict, and that is whythe International Crisis Group (ICG) has been calling the AU to send an international forceinstead of the UN.148Solution proposalThere has been a demand for two separate peace processes; direct peace talks between theparties and a national reconciliation process for a united Somalia. Previous peace initiativeswhere national unity, federalism, and regional options have been considered have all gonedown the drain.149 In January 2002 the 14th attempt began, when the leaders of IGAD decidedon a new initiative for national reconciliation. The talks broke down in 2003 but in 2004 a145 Wais Kassim Dahir Learning the Lessons: The Root Causes of the Somali Conflict, no 45, November 30 2002http://www.somalilandtimes.net/Archive/45/4510.htm. Kivimäki, Timo Explaining violence in Somalia A Study Commissioned bythe the Finnish Foreign Ministry, CTS-Conflict Transformation Service, Studies in a Nutshell, No.4, 2001, p.15- 20146 Kivimäki (2001), p 23147 Africa Report, N° 100, Somalia’s Islamists, 12 December 2005148 Africa Report N° 116149 van Beurden, Jos (2000) Somalia: From Permanent Conflict to More Peacefulness? http://www.conflict-prevention.net/page.php?id=40&formid=73&action=show&surveyid=36 33productive conference in Nairobi agreed on the creation of a transitional government, aproposal supported by the US, UN, AU and the International Somalia Contact Group (ISCG).150 The agreement decided on a five-year transitional period characterised by democraticelements such as elections, welfare politics, political pluralism and human rights. Furthermore,the agreement designated Islam as Somalia's religion and Sharia as the cornerstone oflegislation. TFG’s task was to restore governmental institutions, peace and security, freemovement, and to provide basic service. It should also carry out disarmament campaigns,collect illegal weapons, reintegrate militia members and support the return of refugees.151Implementation & lasting peaceImplementationHowever, mid-term into the TFGs mandate, none of these criteria had been met. Instead inMay 2006, in the growing security vacuum in Mogadishu, fighting began between militiassupporting the transitional government and the Courts. The Courts managed to take controlover the capital, southern and central Somalia, and established in these regions an Islamicleadership focusing on law and order.152 Due to international concern over the continuing civilwar, talks between the two parties under the auspices of the League of Arab States (LAS) werelaunched in Khartoum.153 A cease-fire was agreed upon, there were mutual recognition and awhish to establish a joint police and army force.154 However, there were still disagreementsabout the international mission.155 Suddenly in December 2006, the TFG and Ethiopian forces took back Mogadishu andexpanded southward, leading to increased violence, instability and new chaos.156 Fractionsfrom the Courts formed the Liberation Front Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS)157and as an Ethiopian military intervention and US bombings radical Islamists Al-Shabaabmobilised and took back large parts of the southern parts of Somalia.158150 UD Somalia. United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) UN in Somalia http://www.un-somalia.org/UN_Somalia/index.asp,Accessed in December 2008. Norway Mission to the UN Norway chairs the International Somalia Contact Group, 15 June 2006,http://www.norway-un.org/News/20060615_somalia.htm, Accessed in December 2008151 The Transitional Federal Charter of the Somali Republic, Nairobi, February 2004http://www.iss.co.za/AF/profiles/Somalia/charterfeb04.pdf, Accessed in December 2008152 UD Somalia153 ICG Horn of Africa project154 Amnesty International, http://thereport.amnesty.org/eng/Regions/Africa/Somalia, Accessed in December 2008. ICG,CrisisWatch: Somalia http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?action=cw_search&cw_country=98&cw_date=&l=1&t=1,Accessed in December 2008155 United Nations Department for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO)http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/pub/year_review06/somalia.htm, Accessed in December 2008156 ICG Horn of Africa project157 Swedish Radio Dragkampen om Somalia, 9 February 2008 http://www.sr.se/cgi-bin/P1/program/artikel.asp?programid=1300&artikel=1881897, Accessed in December 2008158 ICG Horn of Africa project 34OutcomeThe International Crisis Group has presented a proposal calling the president to dissolve thegovernment and to invite a senior Hawiye leader and in negotiations with the Courts design anew government. The government and the Courts should in this purpose immediately beginnegotiations and consider the option of outside intervention. The Courts should cease itspower expansion, respect Ethiopia’s territorial sovereignty and underline its commitment tocombat terrorism by inviting UN observers. The Security Council must call on all foreignintervention to end and to respect the arms embargo. The UN should also play a mediatingrole and the AU and IGAD should not carry out plans for intervention even if it is welcomed bythe US and the UN. These actors should focus its work to the International Contact Group andemphasise the importance of a government of genuine national unity even if it would involvesome Islamist elements.159 The situation is very complex and fragile. Even if the 2004 agreement would be properlyimplemented the outcome is far from secured. Unfortunately, it is a constant risk that adevelopment goes towards escalation. The national reconciliation conference scheduled inmid-June 2006 was postponed and has not taken place ever since. On the other hand, anAU peacekeeping (AMISOM) was designated to the area. Recently, changes in the politicalconstellation towards a shift of power to the earlier Courts as their former leader Sheikh SharifAhmed was elected President in elections. His reconciliatory abilities and modest approachmight become an asset. However, in the last year UN Security Council resolutions have ratherbeen occupied with the Somali pirates’ threat to European boats along the coast line than withthe internal reconciliation processes.160 However, a recent positive gesture was the large donorconference in order to support the AMISOM hosted by Ban Ki Moon in Brussels 22-23 May2009.159 IGAD Somalia Peace Process 2006, http://www.igad.org/somaliapeace/SOMAULASIGAD281206.htm, Accessed in December2008. See also Smock, David How to Respond to Somalia's Current Crisis, August 2006, USIPhttp://www.usip.org/pubs/usipeace_briefings/2006/0821_somalia_crisis.html, Accessed in December 2008160 Kroslak, Daniela & Stroehlein, Andrew Oh My Gosh, Pirates! International Herald Tribune, 29 April 2008,http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5412 Accessed in December 2008 353.3. Mozambique Conflict AnalysisBackground & conflict dynamicsContextAfter five centuries under Portuguese rule Mozambique gained its independence in 1975.Large-scale emigration, economic dependence on South Africa, a severe drought, and aprolonged civil war hindered the country’s development during the second half of the 20thcentury.161PartiesAs Portugal denied Mozambique its independence, some groups of the nationalist forces of theindependence movement formed Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (Frelimo) and startedan armed struggle against its coloniser. When Mozambique finally gained its independencepower was delegated to Frelimo aiming to create a socialist state. A resistance movement,Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (Renamo) under leader Dhlakama soon become a militarythreat. Their discontent accumulated in attacks damaging Frelimo’s government and killedmany civilians. In the 80s Frelimo loosened up its ideological extremist policy and its newleader, Chissano, had a more flexible and pragmatic approach.162 The Community Sant’Egidiohad assisted the Vatican in settling disputes of the postcolonial period in Mozambique. Theyhad established good relations with the Mozambican government in organising meetingsbetween them and the Italian Communist Party. San’tEgidio had also been asked for advice bya bishop Gonçalves concerning the difficulties for the religious communities under the Marxistregime. Relations with Renamo were also established later. 163IncompatibilityThe incompatibility in the Mozambique conflict was based on a strictly ideological issueresulting in disagreement on power sharing.161 Central Intelligence Agency – The World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/mz.html#Govt, Accessed in December 2008162 Bartoli, Andrea (1999) Mediating Peace in Mozambique in Crocker, Osler Hampson & Aall (1999) Herding Cats: MultipartyMediation in a complex World, USIP, p.252-255163 Ibid. p.256-257 36SymptomsWe could say that conflict was ripe for resolution because of changes both domestically andinternationally. Internationally, inept and disrespectful decolonisation was an obvious reason.Domestically, damages caused by the violence but also Frelimo’s looser ideological line underits new leader Chissano were other important reasons.164 Since Frelimo saw no possibility formilitary victory, it was willing to explore the possibility of a dialogue with Renamo. In 1990,after direct meetings between the parties’ leaders, Sant’Egidio was ready to be considered aspossible observer to the talks the sides were trying to organise. The mediation team consistedof four members; two from Sant’Egidio, one representative from the Italian government andone representative of Mozambican civil society, bishop Gonçalves. 165Negotiations & peace agreementPower relationsRelations between Frelimo and Renamo have always been rather asymmetrical. Frelimo wasinitially a Marxist party (today Social democrat) which, with some support from the UK andthe Commonwelth, more or less has ruled the country since its independence. Renamo was aconservative anti-communist political faction sponsored by white governments in Rodesia andSouth Africa. The peace accord of 1992 led to the disarmament of Renamo, and the integrationof its fighters to the Mozambican army permitted its transformation into a regular politicalparty. It has since then been the main opposition party.DynamicsConcerning the very process and the mediation behaviour Sant’Egidio provided physical andpsychological space and logistics for translation, accommodation and communication. It wasagreed that the parties would consider the interests of Mozambique and what united them,rather than focusing on what actually divided them. Therefore, they managed to establish acommon working basis for mutual understanding and a problem-solving dialogue. AndreaBartoli argues that the mediation team’s strength was to create synergies. It really tried hard toco-ordinate what was a clear example of multiparty mediation. The US was frequentlyinformed and supported the team. Italy and several other states as well as the UN and theVatican were also involved. A key to success was the cumulative effects of the interactionsbetween these actors (NGOs, states, IOs, etc). During the two year long process personal164 Ibid. p. 250165 Ibid. p. 257-258 37relations had developed among the members. Trust was built, and the delegations wereseriously dedicated to the process.166Solution proposalThe outcome of the mediation is often argued being a clear-cut success. The agreementdeclared a cease-fire and was signed 4 October 1994. It was decided that internationalmonitors would oversee the implementation. It encouraged political pluralism and electionswere to be held. No truth commissions were established since it stood clear that peace wasmore important than justice for the people of Mozambique. However, the political settlementwould take military control and reduce violence and human rights abuses.167Implementation & lasting peaceImplementationThe implementation of the peace agreement was entrusted to the UN which deployed thepeacekeeping mission ONUMOZ under the leadership of Aldo Ajello. It had four componentsthat all were established through reference to the General Peace Agreement: a political,military, humanitarian and electoral. ONUMOZ handled the overarching Supervision andMonitoring Commission as well as the Cease-Fire Commission and the Commission for theReintegration of Demobilised Soldiers. The other commissions were chaired byMozambicans.168 80.000 combatants were demobilized into civil life, Renamo was transformed into apolitical party, and a new unified Army was trained. Therefore, they managed to preventviolence and banditry, and establishing a peaceful environment where an electoral campaigncould take place. Ajello was resolute that no election would take place withoutdemobilization.169 Finally, elections were held in October 1994 with an 87 percent turnout.They were declared free and fair and Frelimo’s Chissano was inaugurated as president.170 Agenuinely democratic system was established and 4 million refugees and displaced personswere repatriated and resettled.171 Further, the humanitarian assistance of the UN and variousNGO was coordinated by the UNOHAC.172 Finally, the timetable for the whole mission was166 Ibid. p. 257-263167 Ibid. p. 264-265, 246168 Ajello, Aldo (1999) Mozambique: Implementation of the 1992 Peace Agreement in Crocker, Osler, Hampson & Aall (1999) HerdingCats: Multiparty Mediation in a complex World, USIP, p. 615, 621-622169 Ibid. p. 631-632, 246170 Ibid. p. 616, 636, 246171 Ibid. p. 617172 Ibid. p. 622 38only a few months, which was completely unrealistic. Luckily, a new timetable was approvedand was flexibly implemented.173OutcomeAccording to Sida, Mozambique is still one of the poorest countries in the world. One forth ofthe country’s aid goes to pay its debts. Anyhow, the peace, democratic elections and marketeconomy brought high growth rates during the 90s and largely improved the prospect fordevelopment. But when the country in 2000 was struck by a terrible flooding, it becameobvious how vulnerable it still was. Lately, aid has been concentrated on supportingreconstruction, poverty reduction but also economic growth, democratisation, human rightsand conflict prevention. 174 Anyhow, I would argue that conflict was resolved in Mozambique. The mediation andimplementation was unusually successful and appropriate, and today’s still difficult situationdepends rather on the power of nature than on human conflict. Humanitarian-, development-and peacebuilding efforts are still helping to improve the situation, which is an incentive forlong-term peacebuilding engagement. Therefore, I would argue that both Bartoli and Ajelloprovide us with good recommendations for conflict resolution.3.4. Weaknesses and Strengths in UN PeacebuildingThe sections above have discussed how the United Nations has handled its peacebuilding task invarious conflict situations over time. This section will now analyse and debate the internationalcommunity’s weaknesses and strengths in these cases.State-centric top-down approach vs. Multi-track diplomacyIn the case of Somalia the power game and top-down approach has been obvious. Wheninternational actors have joined in action, it has often been in favour of one of the parties. Forexample, even though the TFG has been characterised by unpopularity and illegitimacy it hasstill enjoyed formal support by the AU, the UN and IGAD, Ethiopia, the United States ofAmerica (US) and Kenya. The support from the international community has lead to the factthat the TFG which originally was a relatively weak player has gained power on its opponents.The Courts which on the other hand emerged as a relatively efficient and legitimate option173 Ibid. p. 624-625174 SIDA http://www.sida.se/Sida/jsp/polopoly.jsp?d=261, Accessed in December 2008174 See for example Luttwak, Edward (1999) Give War a Chance Foreign Affairs, July/August 1999 or Jenkins, Simon (2005) Let's justleave them in peace the Times, 9 February 2005 39among Somalis, has instead been systematically accused by Ethiopia and the US of just being abunch of radical Islamists. Even if the Courts have tried to establish relations with the UN, EUand the US it has not been regarded as a possible alternative for Somali governance. The Mozambique case on the other hand, has been described as a perfect example ofmulti-track diplomacy where a key to success was the cumulative effects of the interactionsbetween individuals, NGOs, states, and international organisations. The CommunitySant’Egidio had earlier established good relations with the government and therefore couldprovide for a good platform for negotiations. All through the process they encouraged theparties to consider the interests of Mozambique and what united them rather than whatactually divided them. Further, important actors as the UN, US and Italy were frequentlyinformed and supported the team.External intervention vs. Local empowermentWhen it comes to external intervention Somalia is the perfect example of how short-terminterventions can do more harm than good. On top of the fact that Somalia was colonised byItaly and the UK until 1960, it has seen many failed interventions, both peace operations butalso numerous peace talks, conferences and diplomatic efforts led by key international players.The UN and the US left the country when severe violence had broke out. More recently, in2006 Ethiopian forces in support of the TFG took back Mogadishu which instead lead toincreased violence and instability. Ironically these interventions resulted in that radicalIslamists finally took back parts of the south. The early modern history of Mozambique witnessed similar treatment from theinternational community, i.e. the Portuguese colony did not gain its independence until 1975.Instead it became highly dependent on South Africa which together with Rodesia wouldsupport the conservative anti-communist political faction Renamo. Frelimo on the other hand,received support from the UK and the Commonwealth. But Mozambique later came toexperience a treatment that moved from external intervention rather towards actions from theinternational community fostering local empowerment. For example, mediations by an NGOand the implementation by the ONUMOZ entrusting important commissions to be chaired byMozambicans.Short time-frame for negative peace & vs. Long-term process for positive peaceAs already pointed out, Somalia has known a large number of failed interventions. The US andUN withdrawals witness on the total absence of a long term engagement. In the Mozambiquecase on the other hand, the two year long process of peace negotiations fostered personal 40relations, built trust and created sincere dedication to the process. Finally, when it came toimplementation, the timetable was in the beginning very short but was seriously prolonged.Humanitarian-, development- and peacebuilding efforts are still today contributing to improvethe situation which is a clear sign of a long-term peacebuilding engagement.Western perspective vs. Cultural sensitivityWhen we consider what perspective that has guided the peacekeeping efforts in Somalia thereis one clear tendency. For example, the peace agreement designated Islam as the state religionof Somalia and Sharia as the cornerstone of its legislation. But even though many Somaliswould be prepared to accept a system based on a strict interpretation of Sharia law in exchangefor guaranteed peace and security this has still been regarded as unacceptable by theinternational community in general and by the US and Ethiopia in particular. It is widelyspread among these actors the TFG despite illegitimacy is better suited to govern Somalia andguarantee democracy and human rights. On the contrary, in Mozambique the internationalcommunity has often left the decisions to the Mozambicans themselves based on theconviction that nobody else could tell what was best for their people. For example, eventhough truth commissions were high fashion during the time of the peace process inMozambique, no such attempt was established since it was clear that peace was moreimportant than justice for the people of Mozambique.Politico- military focus vs. Psycho-social approach for transformationIn Somalia, the focus for the transitional government was to prepare democratic elections,restore governmental institutions, peace and security, free movement, and to provide for basicservice. It would simultaneously carry out disarmament campaigns, collect illegal weapons,reintegrate militia members and support the return of refugees. The focus was undoubtedly onpolitics and military measures. More recently, this has clearly been shown in the UN SecurityCouncil resolutions that have been more occupied with the threat of Somali pirates thanbringing the peace process back on track. There are a few exceptions however as the IGADattempt to launch an initiative for national reconciliation even though it has never taken place. In similar tradition, the Mozambique peace agreement had four components: a political,military, humanitarian and electoral. However, the agreement encouraged political pluralismand there was a resolute conviction that elections were absolutely not to be held beforedemobilization had taken place. This witnesses on the understanding of the importance ofpsychological factors and what destabilising effects they might have if for example electionsare being rushed before a necessary stable platform has been constructed. After successful 41elections were held, aid has been concentrated on supporting rather social schemes such asreconstruction, poverty reduction, economic growth, democratisation, human rights andconflict prevention. 424. THE BURUNDI PEACEBUILDING COMMISSIONThis chapter is divided into three parts: First, a conflict analysis of the Burundi conflict hasbeen carried out. Second, I will provide a brief outline of the UN Peacebuilding Commission’sstrategic framework for Burundi. The third part is directly concerned with the question: Canwe argue that the UN Peacebuilding Commission for Burundi has contributed to betteraccomplish the UNs peacebuilding mission? The empirical material will be presented,structured and analysed according to the ideal types.4.1. Burundi Conflict AnalysisBackground & conflict dynamicsContextFor centuries, the area where Burundi is situated today, was populated by mainly threepeoples; Twa, Tutsi and Hutu. In 1899 Germany occupied the region and in order to preserveits power and gain advantage against its opponents the Tutsi king allied himself with thecoloniser. Social differences between Hutus and Tutsis had grown stronger during the Tutsidynasty and were further reinforced under the colonial rule. At the German defeat in WorldWar I it was forced to handle over the control over Burundi to Belgium. After World War IIBurundi became a UN Trust Territory under Belgian authority.175 Belgium allowed theestablishment of political parties in the region and as a consequence in 1959 the Burundianruler requested the separation between Rwanda and Burundi. At the same time instability andviolence grew stronger between Hutus and Tutsis.176 In result, Hutu refugees fled to Rwanda toescape the Tutsis which in turn fled back to Burundi escaping the Hutus.177PartiesShort after victory in legislative 1961 elections by the multi-ethnic party Union pour le ProgrésNational (UPRONA), its leader Tutsi Prince Rwagasore was assassinated which intensifiedfighting. Burundian independence was claimed in 1962 and Mwami Mwambutsa IV was namedking. In the constitutional monarchy Hutus and Tutsis were equally represented in the175 US Department of State Background note: Burundi http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2821.htm, Accessed in March 2009. Seealso Sida (2004) A Strategic Conflict Analysis for the Great Lakes Region, p. 138176 Weinstein, Warren & Schrire (1976) Robert A Political Conflict and Ethnic Strategies: a case study of Burundi, Maxwell School ofCitizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University, p. 5-7177 BBC News Timeline: Burundi http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/country_profiles/1068991.stm, Accessed in March 2009 43legislative, however in 1965 the king refused to name a Hutu Prime minister even though theyhad got a majority in elections. Revolts, coups attempts and assassinations of politiciansbecame frequent.178 Finally, one Hutu attack resulted in a military response killingapproximately 250.000 Hutus and forcing 150.000 to flee the country.179 After a Tutsi coup byColonel Jean-Baptiste Bagaza in 1976 a new constitution made Burundi a one party state.However, in 1987 Bagaza was overthrown by Tutsi Pierre Buyoya who suspended theconstitution and installed a military rule – Military Committee for National Salvation (CSMN).In the late 80s another wave of violence resulted in thousands of deaths. The new constitutionof 1992 attempted to finally create a non-ethnic party system. In 1993 Melchior Ndadaye’s Hutu Front for Democracy in Burundi (FRODEBU) won thefirst democratic elections making him the first Hutu head of State. However, Ndadaye wassoon assassinated which resulted in increasing violence and thousands of deaths throughmassacres on Hutus.180 Noumerous Hutu rebel groups started to take form, one of the mostimportant being the Forces Nationales de Liberation (FNL); a hardliner receiving support fromHutu-oriented groups in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The support wasestimated to be both technical and ideological. Another group, the Forces for the Defense ofDemocracy (FDD later merged with the National Council for the Defense of Democracy -CNDD) is supposed to receive support from Tanzanian refugee camps close to the Burundianboarder. It is argued that this support goes high up in the hierarchy, even to the Tanzaniangovernment and the Minister for Foreign Affairs. 181 Two important external actors have been the US and France which both have supportedthe Maputo regime. During the Cold war this resulted in the region becoming a platform forsuperpower rivalry. Concerning France, it has recently been accused of having given assistanceto the Rwandan genocide.182IncompatibilityIn summary, the conflict incompatibility between Hutus (85%) and Tutsis (14%) is mainlyabout power sharing based on ethnic divides, struggle for limited resources, great poverty, andexcluding politics by weak minority governments.183178 BBC News Country Profile: Burundi http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/country_profiles/1068873.stm, Accessed in March 2009179 Sida (2004), p. 137180 BBC News Country Profile: Burundi181 Sida (2004) p. 31-32, 143182 Ibid. p. 34-35183 UD Burundi, http://www.regeringen.se/sb/d/2574/a/75197, Accessed in March 2009. UD (2004) Strategi för svenskt stöd tillStora sjöregionen, p. 7, 31 44SymptomsDecades of internal conflict and violence between Tutsi and Hutu rebel groups has been theoutcome of this power struggle.184 Radical hardliner rebel groups has constantly attacked thegovernment in aspiration for greater power and a more fair power sharing. The response to theviolence has been severe prosecution and massacres of Hutus. In total over 300.000Burundians died and 800.000 had to flee the civil war that lasted for twelve years.185Negotiations & peace agreementPower relationsIn 1996 the Tutsi leader Buyoya took back power through a bloodless coup d’état.186 Hesuspended the constitution and could be sworn in as President and soon initiated peace talksmediated by South Africa.187 On 28 August 2000 both conflicting parties agreed to sign theArusha Peace Agreement which purpose was to define power sharing between the parties andto establish truth, reconciliation and international judicial commissions of inquiry.188 However,even if the President and 13 out of 19 rebel groups signed, hard liners refused to do so.Therefore the part of the agreement deciding on a cease-fire was never signed but it wasagreed on a five year transitional government, senate and national assembly, democracy,reconstruction and reconciliation mechanisms.189 Finally, a peace and power sharing plan waspresented and after periods of escalating violence and Hutu prosecution the cease-fire wassigned in 2003 between the Tutsi government and the Hutu rebel group CNDD-FDD. Later thesame year Hutu Domitien Ndayizeye from FRODEBU was elected President and ethnic quotaswere introduced to come to terms with power sharing within the government. In 2008 whenthe former Hutu rebel Pierre Nkurunziza was elected new President the government started toengage in talks with the Hutu hardliner FNL.190DynamicsThe UN Secretary General was the one that first called for intervention in the Burundi conflict.However, the peace-process soon became highly Africa driven and several state leadersmediated in the conflict. First out was Tanzanian President Mwalimu Julius KambarageNyerere and after his death South Africa’s Nelson Mandela took over. Later, Bill Clinton, Thabo184 Ibid.185 Ibid.186 BBC News Country Profile: Burundi187 Sida (2004), p. 34188 Thallinger (2007), p. 705189 Sida (2004), p. 140-141190 UD (2004), Strategi för svenskt stöd till Stora sjöregionen, p. 7, 31 45Mbeki and Jacob Zuma also supported and facilitated negotiations. Negotiations consisted ofboth formal and informal initiatives, on local, national and regional level, as well as involvingNGOs and private sector and government officials. It was regarded as important to anchor thepeace process for large ownership, internal capacity and African management.191Solution proposalA main objective for the talks was structural transformation of the Burundi military andgovernment aiming at bridging ethnic gaps between Hutus and Tutsis. One important strategywas trying to engage groups in signing the peace agreement and trading this with powersharing carrots such as proposing posts in the government.192 The AU had also participated innegotiation Arusha and in addition a peacekeeping mission (AMIB) was deployed consisting oftroops from Ethiopia, Mozambique and South Africa with the purpose to oversee theinstallation of the transitional government.193 The AU force was later exchanged with a UNpeacekeeping mission (ONUB) as international support for the Burundi peace process grewstronger.194 The objective of the UN peacekeeping mission was to monitor the cease-fire,disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR), provide for humanitarian and refugeeassistance and plan for elections and institutional reform. Power sharing over ethnic linesremained the principal focus of the mission.195Implementation & lasting peaceImplementation & Outcome 196The DDR mission was simultaneously executed as elections were prepared. The outcome was a90 % approval of the new constitution and high turnout in the elections held on various levelsin 2005.197 However, in September 2006 the FNL conducted major attacks on the governmentwhich drastically slowed down the work leading to growing instability.198 Nevertheless, thereconstruction phase started on 31 December 2006 as the UN shut down its ONUBpeacekeeping mission and instead started to implement the Peacebuilding Commission forBurundi.199191 Sida (2004), p. 36-37, 40-41, 42, 144192 BBC News Country Profile: Burundi193 Sida (2004), p. 37194 Ibid. p. 35. See also Howard, Lise Morjé (2008) UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars, Cambridge University Press195 Ibid.196 The ‘outcome’ cannot properly be discussed here since the work of the PBC is still ongoing.197 Howard (2008)198 BBC News Timeline: Burundi, Human Rights Watch Burundi http://www.hrw.org/africa/burundi, Accessed in March 2009199 BBC News Timeline: Burundi, Human Rights Watch Burundi http://www.hrw.org/africa/burundi, Accessed in March 2009 46 After severe FNL bombings of Burundi capital Bujumbura a serious mediation effort bySouth African Minister for Safety & Security Charles Nqakula led to the signing of a new cease-fire on 26 May 2008. The President and FNL leader Agathon Rwasa jointly presented that thissuccessful outcome provided new hope for finally permitting the implementation of reform,truth and reconciliation commissions and special tribunals.200 In December 2008 the FNL wascommitted to implement the peace agreement. Rwasa communicated that disarmament anddemobilisation would start immediately and that the FNL dropped the demand to form anethnical party which is prohibited by the Burundian constitution. In exchange for cooperationthe FNL would gain 33 government posts.2014.2. UN Peacebuilding Commission for BurundiPBC ArchitectureAs a step in the UN reform process, the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Changerecommended the establishment of a Peacebuilding Commission. In December 2005 theSecurity Council and the General Assembly passed two resolutions establishing the UNPeacebuilding Commission (PBC) with the purpose to facilitate peacebuilding in post-conflictsituations. This new body was thought to close the institutional gap that had been localisedwithin UN architecture for conflict resolution mechanisms.202 The purpose of the PBC is “bridging the gap between conflict and recovery” and to“support in the transition from war to sustainable peace and development”.203 The PBC is anintergovernmental advisory body bringing together the entire range of relevant actors, fromfinancial institutions to civil society. Its mandate is fourfold: To propose integrated strategiesfor post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery, to marshal resources for long- and middle-termmissions, to extend post-conflict interventions, and to develop peacebuilding best practices.The PBC’s Integrational Peacebuilding Strategy (IPBS) provides for a political framework toguide the engagement of the PBC with focus on national ownership, mutual accountability andsustainable engagement.204200 Institute for Global Policy PBC Update http://www.pbcupdate.org/, Accessed in March 2009201 Reuters Burundi government, rebels commit to peace 4 December 2008,http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSTRE4B35UC20081204, Accessed in March 2009202 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1645 (2005), S/RES/1645 (2005), 20 December 2005 and United Nations GeneralAssembly Resolution 60/180 (2005), A/RES/60/180, 30 December 2005. When it comes to the policy documents for the BurundiPeacebuilding Commission I will not note the page numbers for two reasons. First, documents are normally very short. Second,documents exist in many different versions and noting page numbers could therefore be very misleading.203 United Nations Peacebuilding Fund www.unpbf.org, Accessed in March 2009. See also United Nations PeacebuildingCommission UN Peacebuilding Architecturehttp://www.un.org/peace/peacebuilding/PBCFastFacts/Peacebuilding%20Architecture%20Jan%202008.pdf, Accessed in March2009204 United Nations Peacebuilding Commission UN Peacebuilding Architecture, Thallinger (2007) p. 681-688 47 The PBC is supported by the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF), a multi-year trust fund for post-conflict peacebuilding, and the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO), a part of the UNSecretariat directly under the Secretary General supporting the PBC and manages the PBF. Thefirst interventions to be carried out under this new mandate were designated to Burundi, andSierra Leone.205PBC BurundiAs the UN shut down its ONUB peacekeeping mission it instead started to implement thePeacebuilding Commission for Burundi on 1 January 2007. The United Nations IntegratedOffice in Burundi (BINUB) had been created by Security Council resolution 1719 (2006) withthe purpose to provide for a coherent UN system assistance to the Burundian government inestablishing peace and stability. Resolution 1791 extended BINUB’s mandate until the end of2008 and the Security Council has recently prolonged it until the end of 2009.206 The national government together with the PBC decided to focus its strategic frameworkon four peacebuilding areas: Good governance, rule of law, security sector reform (SSR) andcommunity recovery with special focus on youth. In particular, the BINUB under theleadership of the Executive Representative of the UN Secretary General concentrates itsactivities to peace consolidation and democratic governance, DDR and SSR, promotion andprotection of human rights, developing measures to end impunity, as well as UN agencycoordination.207PBC Burundi Strategic FrameworkPeacebuilding activities are jointly defined at international and national level. These draw onexisting agreements, resolutions and frameworks providing a basis for priority and planning ofactivities. The fundament is the Peace Agreements followed by resolutions 1719 and 1791 as wellas the Strategic Framework for Poverty Reduction. These feed into the Strategic Framework forPeacebuilding, the Peacebuilding Priority Plan and the UN Integrated Peacebuilding SupportStrategy. Finally these decide the formulation of the Monitoring and Tracking Mechanisms ofthe Strategic Framework, Peacebuilding Projects financed by the PBF and the Joint BINUB andUN Agency Programmes.208205 Ibid.206 BINUB Mandate, strategies and programshttp://binub.turretdev.com/en/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=20&Itemid=48, Accessed in March 2009207 BINUB Mandate, strategies and programs208 BINUB Integrated Planning Process Diagramme http://binub.turretdev.com, Accessed in March 2009 48 The UN Integrated Peacebuilding Support Strategy is guiding the entire strategicframework for the UN’s activities in Burundi. In brief the priorities for the Support Strategy hasbeen defined as: Sustainable reintegration of war victims and other stricken, Fight against HIV-AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis, Equal access to basic social services, Improvement of foodsecurity, as well as Sub-regional integration in peace, security and economic areas.209 Finally, an important part of BINUB’s mandate is to develop joint programs. Suchprograms exist today in three different integrated sectors: A Governance Support Programme,a Security Sector Reform and Small Arms Programme, as well as a Human Rights and JusticeProgramme.2104.3. PBC Burundi Policy DocumentsThis section will debate if we can argue that the UN Peacebuilding Commission for Burundi hascontributed to better accomplish the UNs peacebuilding mission. The policy documents for PBCBurundi will be discussed in the light of the theoretical framework and ideal types. Dependingon how the material will fit into the strainer of ideal types for peacebuilding, it will provide uswith hands-on result on whether PBC Burundi is an example of the criticised traditionalpeacebuilding paradigm or if it is an example answering to the new recommendations for theUN to fulfil its peacebuilding mission.Multi-track diplomacyThe Security Council resolution that established the PBC emphasised “the need for acoordinated, coherent and integrated approach to post-conflict peacebuilding andreconciliation with a view to achieving sustainable peace”, with the purpose to “providerecommendations and information to improve the coordination of all relevant actors withinand outside the United Nations.” It therefore invites “all relevant United Nations bodies andother bodies and actors including the international financial institutions, to take action on theadvice of the Commission” and for the “Commission to consult with civil society,nongovernmental organizations, including women’s organizations, and the private sectorengaged in peacebuilding”.211 In addition the General Assembly resolution underlined the“important role of regional and sub-regional organizations in carrying out post-conflict209 BINUB UN Integrated Peacebuilding Support Strategy in Burundi http://binub.turretdev.com, Accessed in March 2009210 BINUB Mandate Strategies and programs211 S/RES/1645 (2005) 49peacebuilding activities in their regions”.212 These statements all witness of a coherent multi-track approach to peacebuilding. It was agreed upon that a first step would be that “national authorities and the UnitedNations presence in the country will jointly conduct an analysis of critical gaps and, on thatbasis, will draw up a short-term priority plan which contains a select number of criticalinterventions to strengthen and sustain the peacebuilding process”.213 One perfect example ofthis multi-track approach with an extensive diversity of actors was when the fundamentalpolicy document “the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper [Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper]was prepared on the basis of the conclusions and recommendations agreed by consensus inparticipatory consultations with various target groups, namely: rural communities,government agencies, the private sector, civil society, certain vulnerable groups, Parliament,and development partners.” It was also established that “the PRSP [... Poverty ReductionStrategy Paper] will be implemented through technical ministries, community organizations atthe decentralized level, NGOs, civil society and the private sector in partnership withdevelopment partners.”214 An initial step in the peacebuilding process underlining the importance of national leadwas taken as “a priority plan for peacebuilding was jointly elaborated by the Government ofBurundi and the United Nations in collaboration with international partners and ... [through]interaction and dialogue among all actors of society (parliament, locally elected officials,Government, political parties, civil society, the media, private sector and religion)”. It was saidthat in this way the “Government of Burundi wishes to establish...frameworks for dialogue todevelop national peacebuilding strategies.”215 Further, “the elaboration of an IPBS [IntegratedPeacebuilding Strategy] should be vested with the national Government...with the support ofthe United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB) [and in] consultations with keystakeholders on the ground, including civil society organizations, the private sector, religiouscommunities, political parties, United Nations agencies and bilateral and multilateralpartners.216” The Peacebuilding Commission highlights the importance of legitimate individual,national regional and international initiatives. The outcome of the process was regarded assuccessful as “South Africa’s facilitation, the Regional Peace Initiative, chaired by Uganda, aswell as the support from the African Union, the United Nations, and the international212 A/RES/60/180 (2005)213 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 60/984 (2006), A/60/984 (2006), 22 August 2006214 International Monetary Fund Country Report No 07/46, February 2007215 PBSO Priority Plan for Peacebuilding in Burundi, 6 March 2007216 United Nations General Assembly/Security Council Report of the Peacebuilding Commission, A/62/137-S/2007/458, 25 July 2007 50community have been instrumental in strengthening Burundi’s peacemaking and peaceconsolidation efforts”.217 In the peace agreement the parties also expressed their “deepappreciation for the persistent efforts of the Facilitators, the late Mwalimu Julius KambarageNyerere and Mr. Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela, the States of the Great Lakes region and theinternational community with a view to assisting the people of Burundi to return to peace andstability.”218 The statements call for a broad based engagement and funding by “better coordinatingsupport for Burundi in various United Nations governing bodies [was stressed,] encouragingthe broadest participation of partners in all international forums in which support can begarnered for Burundi, and encouraging a broader donor base [and] assisting partners inenhancing the quality of aid delivery to Burundi.” In relation to implementation it washighlighted that “the United Nations System...bilateral and multilateral partners [should]integrate the priorities of the present Strategic Framework into their cooperation programmes;support the implementation of Government priorities as reflected in the Poverty ReductionStrategy Paper (2007-2010) and in the Priority Action Programme (2007-2010).”219 TheCommission also recognised the need “to intensify its efforts to cooperate and coordinate withthe relevant regional and sub-regional organisations to promote the peacebuilding process inthe countries under consideration.”220State-centric top down approachIt is obvious that the Peacebuilding Commission has adopted a multi-track approach topeacebuilding but there are still a few elements suggesting that the UN in traditional mannerregards itself as the leader of the process and that the receiving country should adopt to itsagenda. This is illustrated in the statement; “The Government is currently negotiating with theUnited Nations Secretariat to set up a framework agreement for the organization andfunctioning of mechanisms of Transitional Justice.”221Local empowermentThe initial resolutions highlights “the importance of supporting national efforts to establish,redevelop or reform institutions”222 and for the international community to recognise “theneed for a dedicated institutional mechanism to address the special needs of countries217 Ibid.218 Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi, 28 August 2000219 United Nations Peacebuilding Commission, PBC /1/BDI/4*, 30 July 2007220 A/62/137-S/2007/458221 PBSO Priority Plan for Peacebuilding in Burundi, 6 March 2007222 S/RES/1645 (2005) 51emerging from conflict towards recovery, reintegration and reconstruction and to assist themin laying the foundation for sustainable development”. They affirm “the primary responsibilityof national and transitional Governments”223 and “its strong commitment to the sovereignty,independence, territorial integrity and unity of Burundi, and emphasising the importance ofnational ownership by Burundi of peacebuilding, security and long-term development.”224 The purpose with the UN presence in the country is therefore to assist Burundi in“strengthening the capacity of national institutions and civil society...strengthening goodgovernance and the transparency and accountability of public institutions...promotion offreedom of the press...consolidation of the rule of law”.225 The UN is “committed to an inclusiveand nationally driven process aimed at maximizing the involvement of all relevant actors onthe ground, including civil society and in the broader international community”. It isimportant that the “substance should be led form the ground, with the national Government inthe lead, and an inclusive process from the start with the involvement of other key nationaland international stakeholders”.226 The conclusion is that “both national ownership and partnership are essential for thesuccess of peacebuilding efforts in post-conflict situations. The Government, the Commissionand the partners will have to strike the right balance between these two imperatives.” They willhave to “establish and conduct frameworks for dialogue and consultation and consider thecontribution of various stakeholders, in order to develop a national consensus on questionsrelated to peacebuilding and to develop a vision which engages the leadership and people ofBurundi in a process of consolidation of democracy and peace”. It is also important to“strengthen dialogue between the Government and the private sector in order to increase itsvalue added in the recovery of macroeconomic indicators” as well as engaging “political partiesrepresented in Parliament and/or in local councils [... to] integrate the priorities of theStrategic Framework into the missions and programmes elaborated by the political parties...The opposition should play a role in full respect for the law and in a constructive spirit.”227External interventionIt is clear that all policy documents avoid statements related to external intervention due to itsneo-colonial connotation. Instead, they tend to emphasise the importance of legitimacy,national lead and ownership, coherence and coordination.223 A/RES/60/180 (2005)224 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1719 (2006), S/RES/1719 (2006), 25 October 2006225 Ibid.226 A/62/137-S/2007/458227 PBC /1/BDI/4* 52Long-term process for positive peaceThere is a true aim that the PBC will provide for long-term engagement in the processes ofpeacebuilding towards reaching lasting peace. For example, initially it was decided to“establish a multi-year standing peacebuilding fund...ensuring the immediate release ofresources needed to launch peacebuilding activities and the availability of appropriatefinancing for recovery.”228 The decision to “establish the Peacebuilding Fund should contributetowards addressing a critical gap that is particularly common immediately following thesigning of peace agreements [...in order] to consolidate the peace process [so] post-conflictcountries [can] continue to benefit from the sustained attention and support of theinternational community”. “Member States are invited to give their support... and areencouraged to provide regular voluntary contributions to ensure that it effectively addressesthe critical peacebuilding activities”.229 This witness of an understanding of a “need for the United Nations system and theinternational community to maintain their support for the security and long-termdevelopment”.230 “Burundi’s future will depend on its capacity to deliver strong and lastingeconomic growth to feed its ever growing population and reduce poverty. Promoting suchgrowth is one of the priority objectives of the ... Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper [which]presents a medium- and long-term development vision for Burundi and sets out bold povertyreduction objectives, which are consistent with the government’s 2005-2010 priority programand the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).”231 “Providing continued peacebuilding assistance to the Burundian Government bystrengthening national capacity to address the root causes of conflict”,232 gives an indication ofthe adoption of a positive definition of peace. Further, “the Strategic Framework shouldprovide an updated and conflict-sensitive analysis of priorities, constraints and gaps ... and theneed to prioritize interventions that will prevent the country’s relapse into conflict.” “TheStrategic Framework recognizes that Burundi will need the sustained attention of theinternational community until the establishment of foundations for sustainable peace anddevelopment”.233 Therefore, “the Peacebuilding Commission reiterates its determination toprovide unflagging support to Burundi in the consolidation of peace with a view to securing afuture that is free from fear and free form want.”234 This derives from the peace agreementwhich reaffirmed the “unwavering determination to put an end to the root causes underlying228 S/RES/1645 (2005)229 A/60/984 (2006)230 S/RES/1719 (2006) United Nations Security Council Resolution 1791 (2007), S/RES/1791 (2007), 19 December 2007231 IMF Country Report No 07/46232 S/RES/1719 (2006)233 A/62/137-S/2007/458234 PBC /1/BDI/4* 53the recurrent state of violence, bloodshed, insecurity, political instability, genocide andexclusion which is inflicting sever hardships and suffering on the people of Burundi, andseriously hampers the prospects for economic development and the attainment of equality andsocial justice in our country.”235Short time-frame for negative peaceEven though the section above has witnessed of a long-term engagement for sustainabledevelopment the material also shows another side focusing rather on a short perspective. Forexample, it is highlighted that the PBSO is supposed “to assist and support the Commission ...towards meeting short and medium-term recovery goals”.236 Concerning the PBF, it should“focus on delivering the greatest value added during the very early stages of a peacebuildingprocess, before ... country-specific multi-donor trust funds have been set up”. “There may,however, be specific instances in which the Peacebuilding Fund could meaningfully extendsupport to countries at a more advanced stage of their peacebuilding process.”237 It is clear that the definition of ‘long-term engagement’ is ambivalent when it isemphasized that “Le programme conjoint est prevue pour une durée de deux ans”238 or when it inthe end of 2007 was decided to “extend until 31 December 2008 the mandate of BINUB”, that isonly one year at a time.239 Nevertheless, it has been recognised that “the structural changesthat need to occur in the country are both broad and deep and it is therefore not realistic tothink that the process will have been competed in the next two years [and] concentratedefforts in this sector will need to be continued after BINUB has passed from the scene.”240However, this statement raises the question how anyone even could imagine that sustainablepeace and development can be guaranteed in only two years. Finally, meeting long- or evenshort-term engagements will be very difficult if “the immediate capacities to initiate the work... are limited” due to limited recourses and financing.241Cultural sensitivityReferences as well as content show that the peace agreement has been the bases for the policydocuments for peacebuilding in Burundi. The message in the agreement is that the Burundianswish to “shape a political order and a system of government inspired by the realities of our235 Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi236 S/RES/1645 (2005)237 A/60/984 (2006)238 BINUB Programme Conjoint d’appui à la Consolidation de la Paix et a la Gouvernance au Burundihttp://binub.turretdev.com/images/articles/paix1.pdf, Accessed in March 2009239 S/RES/1791 (2007)240 BINUB Human Rights and Justice Joint Programme http://binub.turretdev.com/en/images/articles/HR1.pdf, Accessed in March2009241 PBSO Priority Plan for Peacebuilding in Burundi 54country and founded on the values of justice, democracy, good governance, pluralism, respectfor the fundamental tolerance and cooperation among the different ethnic groups within oursociety”. Further, “positive traditional cultural values such as solidarity, social cooperation,forgiveness and mutual tolerance, Ibanga (discretion and sense of responsibility), Ubupfasoni(respect for others and for oneself) and Ubuntu (humanism and character)” will be essential forthe nation-buildning process. “Peace, stability, justice, the rule of law, national reconciliation,unity and development are the major aspirations of the people of Burundi”.242 It is clear that external missions to Burundi are legitimate since the Parties of the conflicthas urged “the heads of State of the countries of the region to continue to provide theirsupport for the peace process in Burundi” and that there has been a national call to “submit tothe United Nations a request for an international peacekeeping force”.243 That is, externalinvolvement has not been enforced from without but instead demanded from within. Inaddition, it is emphasised to learn from other regional contexts where similar have occurred.For example, “countries that have experienced recent post-conflict recovery would makevaluable contributions to the work of the Peacebuilding Commission”.244 Other elements that are highlighted throughout the documents is equality in generaland gender equality in particular. For example, the Security Council “calls upon theCommission to integrate a gender perspective into all its work”.245 This has been translatedinto practice in the peace agreement; “the following criteria shall be used to determine theimbalances in the defence and security forces: political; ethnic; regional; gender” or “propertyrights shall be guaranteed for all men, women and children”.246 This is totally in line with theinternational community “affirming the primary responsibility of national and transitionalGovernments...in identifying their priorities and strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding, witha view to ensuring national ownership”247 and “recognizing the continued ownership of theprocess by the countries of the region”.248 Another element paying cultural respect to the national context is the involvement ofreligious actors. For example, “standing invitations were extended to the InternationalMonetary Fund, the World Bank, the European Community and the Organization of IslamicConference to participate in all meetings”,249 “civil society, religious communities and theBashingantahe institution [... should] assess the extent to which national priorities are in line242 Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi243 Ibid.244 A/RES/60/180 (2005)245 S/RES/1645 (2005)246 Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi247 S/RES/1645 (2005)248 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1653 (2006), S/RES/1653 (2006), 27 January 2006249 A/62/137-S/2007/458 55with community aspirations and make the necessary recommendations”.250 “Through itsrepresentatives in civil society and religious groups, the population expressed the need forreconciliation, sharing of experiences, search for the truth on the past and to obtain answers, ifneed be, through reconciliatory and non-vindictive justice.”251Western perspectiveHowever, even though the peace agreement has guided the peacebuilding response of theinternational community in a cultural-sensitive manner the agreement nevertheless pointedout who is to blame for the conflict: “The following were identified as responsible for andagents of the insecurity and violence: (a) Some foreign countries, foreign organizations,political or otherwise, and certain foreign lobbies”.252 This is a sign of unwanted involvementfrom actors lacking legitimacy and enforcing solutions from an outside perspective.Psycho-social approach for transformationOne of the fundamental policy documents guiding the peacebuilding work underlines that“Burundi’s future will depend on its capacity to deliver strong and lasting economic growth tofeed its ever growing population and reduce poverty. Promoting such growth is one of thepriority objectives of the PRSP”. Further, there is “consensus on four main strategic axes: (i)improving governance and security; (ii) promoting sustainable and equitable economicgrowth; (iii) developing human capital; (iv) combating HIV/AIDS”.253 This witnesses on a broad approach to post-conflict development where it is highlightedthat “economic reforms need to be implemented concurrently with basic social protectionreforms”.254 “The objective is to re-establish quality social services [... and] targeting the healthand education sectors, water supply and sanitation, urban planning and decent housing forall”.255 Further, “providing training and technical support with a potential for small businesscreation and income generation [... and] job creation” will be very important. But also “toestablish a solid base for prevention and resolution of land questions”256 because “unless lastingsolutions are found for the land issue, it is likely to constrain socio-economic reintegration andto exacerbate conflicts and insecurity in rural areas”.257250 PBC /1/BDI/4*251 PBSO Priority Plan for Peacebuilding in Burundi252 Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi253 IMF Country Report No 07/46254 PBC /1/BDI/4*255 IMF Country Report No 07/46256 PBSO Priority Plan for Peacebuilding in Burundi257 PBC /1/BDI/4* 56 “Meeting the challenges of socio-economic recovery requires immediate large-scale,targeted interventions focusing on the most urgent rehabilitation needs, especially those ofyoung people, women and other vulnerable populations.”258 The gender approach is veryimportant throughout the material and it is underlined that “women represent one of the mostvulnerable categories of victims of conflict [... but] are also true actors of survival and solidarityduring conflicts”. Therefore, “we will need to invest in women in order for them to maintaintheir momentum as peace-builders and promoters of social cohesion. The contribution ofwomen’s networks for peace, fight against gender based violence and other structures aimed athelping women survive, constitutes a condition for peacebuilding in Burundi.”259 In addition to above mentioned socio-economic measures, the psychological dimensionof peacebuilding is highly emphasised. A UN resolution “urges the authorities and all politicalactors in Burundi...to maintain the spirit of dialogue, consensus-building and inclusiveness”.260This is also the case when “the peace accords envisage the setting up of mechanisms oftransitional justice. Through its representatives in civil society and religious groups, thepopulation expressed the need for reconciliation, sharing of experiences, search for the truthon the past and to obtain answers, if need be, through reconciliatory and non-vindictivejustice.”261 Therefore, there has been an agreement on the “establishment of a truth andreconciliation commission or a special international tribunal to prosecute the crime ofgenocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity”. This is regarded as important because “impunity of crimes committed sinceindependence is one of the fundamental causes of the Burundian conflict [... and] the absenceof mechanisms that would allow the people to recall the various waves of violence...is a barrierto national reconciliation.”262 This view is connected to the understanding that “thatdevelopment, peace and security and human rights are interlinked and mutuallyreinforcing”.263 The international community is therefore “calling upon the authorities and allpolitical actors in Burundi to persevere in their dialogue on achieving stability and nationalreconciliation...to promote social harmony in their country”.264 “The Burundian crisis is aprofound one: the task of reconciliation will be long and exacting. There are still gapingwounds which will need to be healed”.265 It will therefore be important to “contribute to the258 Ibid.259 PBSO Priority Plan for Peacebuilding in Burundi260 S/RES/1719 (2006)261 PBSO Priority Plan for Peacebuilding in Burundi262 PBC /1/BDI/4*263 S/RES/1645 (2005)264 S/RES/1719 (2006)265 Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi 57moral reconstruction of the country, to listening and to healing the memories and trauma”.266In doing so “expectations are high and the Government’s ability to face them is a condition tore-establish popular confidence in state institutions, which are believed to have lost touch withthe plight of the population”.267 Eventually, “confidence will reduce tensions, bring about asocial climate conducive to prevention of conflict and spur economic exchanges”.268Politico- military focusHowever, even though psycho-social dimensions are widely emphasized, politics and militaryactions still take up much of the peacebuilding focus. For example, it is argued that “improvingBurundi’s security situation after over a decade of conflict is a sine qua non condition forrestoring an environment conducive to economic recovery and national reconciliation”.269Clear priorities are therefore “consolidating democratically-elected institutions and goodgovernance... disarmament, demobilization and reinsertion process and the reform of thesecurity sector”.270 For example, several statements emphasise security actions as the mostimportant condition in order to achieve peace: “the return to peace and security in Burundirequires a return to the barracks of members of the Forces de Defense Nationale (FDN)”.271266 PBC /1/BDI/4*267 PBSO Priority Plan for Peacebuilding in Burundi268 Ibid.269 IMF Country Report No 07/46270 S/RES/1791 (2007)271 PBSO Priority Plan for Peacebuilding in Burundi 585. CONCLUDING REMARKS5.1. SummaryThis research project has analysed the ideas guiding the policy documents of the UNPeacebuilding Commission in the case of Burundi in the light of the UN’s earlier interventionsin Mozambique and Somalia. In order to do so, a theoretical framework has responded to inwhat terms the debate concerning peacebuilding has been proceeding over the last decades. Thissection has outlined the critique of the peacebuilding paradigm that has been guiding UNpeacebuilding which has been met by recommendations for a new approach to peacebuilding. A next step has been to answer to how the United Nations has handled its peacebuildingtask in various conflict situations over time and what have been the weaknesses and strengths inthese cases. Here, the Mozambique and Somalia examples have illustrated both the historicalas well as normative aspects of UN peacebuilding. In summarising the result and analysis Iwould argue that the international community’s involvement in Somalia has so far strictly beenlimited to peacekeeping or even peacemaking efforts. There are no signs of peacebuildingefforts because of the ‘negative’ approach to peace but also because the situation still has notreached a post-conflict phase. I would argue that the international community, and a numberof states in particular, have had a great deal to do with the fact that the conflict has not movedtowards resolution or even settlement. On the other hand, I have pointed out thatMozambique is an example that provides us with good recommendations for conflictresolution and peacebuilding even before there were any formal frameworks orinstitutionalised operations for post-conflict peacebuilding. The Burundi chapter has provided material to answer if we can argue that the UNPeacebuilding Commission for Burundi has contributed to better accomplish the UNspeacebuilding mission. This section has shown that the policy documents guiding UNpeacebuilding in Burundi to a large extent reflect the academic recommendations onpeacebuilding. The policy is characterised by a multi-track approach focusing on coordinationbetween actors on different levels yet favouring local empowerment. It draws on a culturalsensitivity towards the Burundian society departing from the peace agreement and theconviction of the importance of national ownership. In addition, reconciliation and conflicttransformation is deeply emphasised in all policy documents. However, there are still a fewdrawbacks witnessing of the old peacebuilding heritage. Most prominent is that even thoughstatements as ‘sustainable’, ‘durable’ and ‘long-term’ are widely used, the time frame is still fartoo limited. However, this might be an effect of limited funding rather than the lack of political 59good will. Finally, it is obvious that political, military and security aspects (elections, SSR, DDRetc) are still regarded as the most essential elements of peacebuilding even though psycho-social aspects (reconciliation, growth, gender equality etc) are given much more attention thanbefore. However, all together one must argue that the Peacebuilding Commission for Burundicorresponds to the ‘new recommendations’ for peacebuilding.5.2. ConclusionsThe overall purpose of this research project has been to analyse whether the PeacebuildingCommission so far has contributed to fulfilling the second UN peacebuilding task, i.e. toimplement the signed peace agreement and manage the post-conflict reconstruction phasethus creating more genuine conditions for lasting peace. Analysing the results according to thetheoretical framework and the ideal types has permitted us to respond to the researchquestion: Has the UN Peacebuilding Commission enhanced the United Nations’ ability to fulfilits peacebuilding role? The theoretical framework has in a qualitative manner clarified the relation between thedependent, independent and intermediate relevant variables. The independent variable hasbeen identified as ‘lasting peace’, the dependent variables as ‘the signing of a peace agreement’and ‘an adequate peacebuilding response’. The intermediate variables are the very conditionsfor peacebuilding outlined in the framework as constructing pairs of ideal types. The twodependent variables are individually not enough to fulfil ‘lasting peace’, i.e. it requires both‘the signing of a peace agreement’ and ‘an adequate peacebuilding response’. First, the positiveexample of Mozambique has underlined the validity of the relation between these variables,that ‘the signing of a peace agreement’ together with ‘an adequate peacebuilding response’ willresult in ‘lasting peace’. Second, the negative example Somalia has shown that there will be anabsence of ‘lasting peace’ where there only is a ‘signing of a peace agreement’ but a lack of ‘anadequate peacebuilding response’. The Burundi example appears as closer to the Mozambique than the Somali case when itcomes to the independent variables, i.e. the conditions for peacebuilding. It would not be anexaggeration to argue that these conditions together relatively well answer to what has beenpointed out as ‘an adequate peacebuilding response’ illustrated by ‘the new recommendationsfor peacebuilding’. As in the Mozambique case this has together with ‘the signing of a peaceagreement’ provided conditions for ‘lasting peace’. However, contrarily to the Mozambiqueexample, it is far too soon to predict any final outcome of the Burundi peacebuilding processbut we can at least establish that there is both political will and the fulfilment of fundamental 60conditions for a future ‘lasting peace’. Only time will tell if Burundi will provide us with yet asuccessful example for UN peacebuilding in general and the Peacebuilding Commission inparticular.5.3. Future implicationsI find it relevant to briefly discuss the possible implications of the outcome of this study: Whatconsequences could this have for the future role of the UN? Initially, the theoretical frameworktook its departure in theories explaining the rise, design, change and decline of institutions.We asked how we best can understand the process of UN reform and adopted a synthesisedperspective on institutions for a more integrated view on institutions in order to explain whymany institutions are relatively difficult to change. We suggested that the institutionalisationand design of collective security could be described by rational institutionalism explaining theemergence and structure of institutions as reactions to sub-optimal outcomes. I would arguethat the Peacebuilding Commission is a good example of a reaction to a sub-optimal outcome.Its very establishment was due to reactions on the failure of peacekeeping operations toimplement peace agreements and providing conditions for lasting peace preventing post-conflict situations to relapse into conflict. The development and change within the UN system was considered to most adequatelybe explained by sociological institutionalism emphasizing the diversity of actors in the norm-guided behaviour of institution-building where there is a strong desire to imitate, to fit in, tocooperate, and to develop common standards. Here, the Peacebuilding Commission is afunction of the change in norms regarding conflict resolution within the internationalcommunity. Advocacy from academia and field workers finally trickled down to national,regional and international politicians, leading to a serious norm shift from emphasisingnegative peace and ‘conflict settlement’ towards uplifting ‘conflict resolution’ based on positivepeace. We discussed how the UN’s peacebuilding role could be enhanced through sociallyinclusive ‘new models for governance’ aiming at safeguarding pluralism and diversity in policymaking through providing communication, legitimacy, diversity, equality of conditions,confidence and responsibility. Here, the very functioning of the Peacebuilding Commissionwhere the work is based on a constant dialogue between multiple actors on all levels is a verygood example in itself. However, this requires that the basic policy documents and peaceagreements express the same values for the PBC to legitimately act in this manner. 61Finally, the above argument permits us not to predict but to discuss possible future outcomesof UN reform in general and peacebuilding institutionalisation in particular. In the smallerperspective, even if this thesis has argued that the PBC already at this early stage is quite welloff already, a couple of crucial tasks still remain for a future successful outcome. Most crucialissues to solve ahead are time/resources/financing as well as reconciliation/transitionaljustice/transformation. How will it be possible to mobilise resources to make financing oflong-term peacebuilding missions possible? How will the gap between transitional justice andconflict transformation and reconciliation be overcome without relapsing into violence? Thesequestions raise the most delicate dilemmas to both the PBC in general and for Burundi inparticular. Concerning the Burundi case overcoming problems related to refugee return andland property will be most crucial. However, it is not our task to address these issues here butthey can be an inspiration for further research. In the larger perspective, does the UN Peacebuilding Commission provide a shift towards anew paradigm for conflict resolution? Looking at the Peacebuilding Commission it is clear thatthe UN is seeking to overcome traditional hierarchical super-power politics through a shifttowards the promotion of an inclusive dialogue among all actors on different levels. The PBCcan be seen as a response to Kofi Annan’s request for making “conflict prevention thecornerstone of collective security in the twenty-first century”. By linking peacebuilding toconflict prevention the PBC can be a step in the right direction in fulfilling this goal;Promoting positive peace through an adequate peacebuilding response will prevent futureconflict. However, whether there will be a constant shift towards prevention will depend onthe growing understanding of prevention as more cost-effective than reaction. Even ifprevention can appear as costly since money is spent on preventing a future scenario thathopefully never will take place, the amounts are far smaller than those that would have to bespent on interventions targeted to end conflict when it already has broken out. However, eventhough it might appear obvious, this equation is yet not clear to those paying for the party. Inthis case, those who normally advocate reason and efficiency seem to let sense be ruled out bysensibility. 626. BIBLIOGRAPHY6.1. LiteratureAbiew, FK & T. 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Electronic sourcesAmnesty International, http://thereport.amnesty.org/eng/Regions/Africa/Somalia, Accessed inDecember 2008BBC News Country profile: Burundihttp://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/country_profiles/1068873.stm, Accessed in March 2009BBC News Country profile: Somaliahttp://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/country_profiles/1072592.stm, Accessed in December 2008BBC News Somalia: Who supports who?, 28 December 2006http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/5092586.stm, Accessed in December 2008BBC News Timeline: Burundihttp://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/country_profiles/1068991.stm, Accessed in March2009Central Intelligence Agency – The World Factbook,https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/mz.html#Govt, Accessed inDecember 2008French Ministry for Foreign Affairs http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/pays-zones-geo_833/afrique_1063/organisations-regionales-africaines_404/igad_13136/igad_28693.html,Accessed in December 2008Human Rights Watch Burundi http://www.hrw.org/africa/burundi, Accessed in March 2009IGAD Somalia Peace Process 2006,http://www.igad.org/somaliapeace/SOMAULASIGAD281206.htm, Accessed in December 2008Institute for Global Policy PBC Update http://www.pbcupdate.org/, Accessed in March 2009International Crisis Group Horn of Africa projecthttp://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=1166&l=1, Accessed December 2008International Crisis Group CrisisWatch: Somaliahttp://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?action=cw_search&cw_country=98&cw_date=&l=1&t=1, Accessed in December 2008Kroslak, Daniela & Stroehlein, Andrew Oh My Gosh, Pirates! International Herald Tribune, 29April 2008, http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5412 67Norway Mission to the UN Norway chairs the International Somalia Contact Group, 15 June 2006,http://www.norway-un.org/News/20060615_somalia.htm, Accessed in December 2008OECD (2008) Evaluating Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities,http://www.oecd.org/secure/pdfDocument/0,2834,en_21571361_34047972_39774574_1_1_1_1,00.pdf, Accessed in March 2009Reuters Burundi government, rebels commit to peace 4 December 2008,http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSTRE4B35UC20081204, Accessed in March2009Sida (2004) A Strategic Conflict Analysis for the Great Lakes RegionSmock, David How to Respond to Somalia's Current Crisis, August 2006, USIPhttp://www.usip.org/pubs/usipeace_briefings/2006/0821_somalia_crisis.html, Accessed inDecember 2008Swedish Radio Dragkampen om Somalia, 9 February 2008 http://www.sr.se/cgi-bin/P1/program/artikel.asp?programid=1300&artikel=1881897, Accessed in December 2008US Department of State Background note: Burundi http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2821.htm,Accessed in March 2009Utrikesdepartementet (2004), Strategi för svenskt stöd till Stora sjöregionen, p. 7, 31Utrikesdepartementet Burundi, http://www.regeringen.se/sb/d/2574/a/75197, Accessed inMarch 2009. 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Policy documentsArusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi, 28 August 2000BINUB Human Rights and Justice Joint Programmehttp://binub.turretdev.com/en/images/articles/HR1.pdf, Accessed in March 2009BINUB Integrated Planning Process Diagramme http://binub.turretdev.com, Accessed inMarch 2009 68BINUB Mandate Strategies and programshttp://binub.turretdev.com/en/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=20&Itemid=48,Accessed in March 2009BINUB Programme Conjoint d’appui à la Consolidation de la Paix et a la Gouvernance auBurundi http://binub.turretdev.com/images/articles/paix1.pdf, Accessed in March 2009BINUB UN Integrated Peacebuilding Support Strategy in Burundi http://binub.turretdev.com,Accessed in March 2009International Monetary Fund Country Report No 07/46, February 2007PBSO Priority Plan for Peacebuilding in Burundi, 6 March 2007Report of the Secretary-General (1992) An Agenda for Peace - Preventive diplomacy,peacemaking and peace-keeping, United Nations Security Council A/47/277 - S/24111, § 21Report of the Secretary-General (1995) Supplement to an agenda for peace, United NationsSecurity Council A/50/60 - S/1995/1Report of the Secretary-General (2001) Prevention of armed conflict, United Nations GeneralAssemblyReport of the Secretary-General (2005) In larger freedom: towards development, security andhuman rights for all, United Nations General Assembly A/59/2005The Transitional Federal Charter of the Somali Republic, Nairobi, February 2004http://www.iss.co.za/AF/profiles/Somalia/charterfeb04.pdf, Accessed in December 2008United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1653 (2006), S/RES/1653 (2006), 27 January 2006United Nations General Assembly Resolution 60/180 (2005), A/RES/60/180, 30 December 2005United Nations General Assembly Resolution 60/984 (2006), A/60/984 (2006), 22 August 2006United Nations General Assembly/Security Council Report of the Peacebuilding Commission,A/62/137-S/2007/458, 25 July 2007United Nations Peacebuilding Commission UN Peacebuilding Architecturehttp://www.un.org/peace/peacebuilding/PBCFastFacts/Peacebuilding%20Architecture%20Jan%202008.pdf, Accessed in March 2009United Nations Peacebuilding Commission, PBC /1/BDI/4*, 30 July 2007United Nations Peacebuilding Fund www.unpbf.org, Accessed in March 2009.United Nations Political Office for Somalia UN in Somalia http://www.un-somalia.org/UN_Somalia/index.asp, Accessed in December 2008United Nations Security Council Resolution 1645 (2005), S/RES/1645 (2005), 20 December 2005United Nations Security Council Resolution 1719 (2006), S/RES/1719 (2006), 25 October 2006United Nations Security Council Resolution 1791 (2007), S/RES/1791 (2007), 19 December 2007 69APPENDIX : ABBREVIATIONSThis list of abbreviations also appears here in the appendix in order to provide useful guidance asa separate sheet, facilitating reading of sections that contain a large number of abbreviations.AMIB African peacekeeping mission in BurundiAMISOM African Union Mission to SomaliaARS Liberation Front Alliance for the Re-Liberation of SomaliaAU African UnionBBC British Broadcasting CompanyBINUB Bureau Intégré des Nations Unies au Burundi (United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi)CIA Central Intelligence AgencyCNDD National Council for the Defence of DemocracyCSMN Military Committee for National SalvationDDR Disarmament, Demobilisation and ReintegrationDPKO United Nations Department for Peacekeeping OperationsDRC Democratic Republic of CongoFDD Forces for the Defense of DemocracyFDN Forces de Défense Nationale (National Defence Force)FNL Forces Nationales de Libération (National Liberation Front)FRELIMO Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (Liberation Front of Mozambique)FRODEBU Hutu Front for Democracy in BurundiICG International Crisis GroupIGAD Inter-governmental Authority on DevelopmentIMF International Monetary FundIO International OrganisationIPBS Integrational Peacebuilding StrategyISCG International Somalia Contact GroupLAS League of Arab StatesMDGs Millennium Development GoalsNGO Non-governmental OrganisationOECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and DevelopmentONUMOZ United Nations Operations in MozambiquePBC Peacebuilding CommissionPBF Peacebuilding FundPBSO Peacebuilding Support OfficePRSP Poverty Reduction Strategy PaperRENAMO Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (Mozambican National Resistance)SICC Supreme Islamic Courts CouncilSida Swedish International Development Cooperation AgencySSR Security Sector ReformTFG Transitional Federal GovernmentUD Utrikesdepartementet (Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs)UIC Union of Islamic CourtsUN United NationsUNOHAC United Nations Office for Humanitarian Assistance CoordinationUNPOS United Nations Political Office for SomaliaUPRONA Union pour le Progrès National (Union for National Progress)US United States of America
USIP United States Institute of Peace
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